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>ate: ~tt1/2016
·;me:

Second Judicial D;··~ict Court - Lewis County

i.7 AM

'age 1 of 8

User: NICOLE

h-...A Report

Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice

Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
late
./30/2012

Judge
New Case Filed - Personal Injury

Michael J Griffin

Filing: A4 - Personal injury Paid by: Carpenter Law Firm Receipt
number: 0001190 Dated: 8/30/2012 Amount: $96.00 (Cashiers Check)
For: Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff)

Michael J Griffin

Plaintiff: Krinitt, Perry Appearance Charles H Carpenter

Michael J Griffin

Plaintiff: Peralta, Eryn Appearance Charles H Carpenter

Michael J Griffin

Complaint Filed

Michael J Griffin

Summons Issued

Michael J Griffin

Summons Issued

Michael J Griffin

Affidavit Of Service

Michael J Griffin

Affidavit Of Service

Michael J Griffin

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
petitioner Paid by: Peter Johnson Receipt number: 0001348 Dated:
9/27/2012 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: State Of Idaho Department of Fish
and Game (defendant)

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Appearance

Michael J Griffin

Defendant: State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game Appearance
Peter J Johnson

Michael J Griffin

Defendant: State Of Idaho Appearance Peter J Johnson

Michael J Griffin

Special Deputy Attorney General Appointment

Michael J Griffin

0/22/2012

Answer, affirmative defenses and jury demand

Michael J Griffin

1/9/2012

Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

Michael J Griffin

1/21/2012

Notice of Unavailability

Michael J Griffin

2/5/2012

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 01/22/2013 10:30 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Order setting planning and scheduling conference IRCP 16b

Michael J Griffin

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 1/22/2013
Time: 10:48 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: NICOLE
Tape Number:

Michael J Griffin

,12012012
/27/2012

/22/2013

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 01/22/2013 10:30 Michael J Griffin
AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 01/22/201310:30 Michael J Griffin
AM: Hearing Held
:/14/2013
;/20/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/21/2014 09:00 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Proposed Scheduling Order

Michael J Griffin

Hearing Scheduled (Final Pre-Trial Conference 05/06/2014 09:30 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Service of discovery

OOiJ U i{
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice

Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate

Judge

3/25/2013

Stipulation for Joint Discovery

Michael J Griffin

i/25/2013

Notice Of Service of discovery requests

Michael J Griffin

7/2/2013

Notice of unavailability

Michael J Griffin

7/15/2013

Unopposed Motion to amend scheduling order

Michael J Griffin

3/15/2013

Notice Of Service of discovery

Michael J Griffin

3/29/2013

Notice Of Service of Discovery of Requests

Michael J Griffin

~/5/2013

Notice Of Service of discovery

Michael J Griffin

U23/2013

Notice Of Service of discovery requests

Michael J Griffin

10/9/2013

Notice Of Service of discovery

Michael J Griffin

11/25/2013

Notice of unavalilability

Michael J Griffin

12/23/2013

Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson in support of Defendant's motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as to the claims of Plaintiff Peralta

Michael J Griffin

Defendant's Motion For Parial Summary Judgment as to the claims of
plaintiff Peralta

Michael J Griffin

Memorandum of points and authorities in support of Defendants' motion for Michael J Griffin
partial summary judgment as to the claims of plaintiff Peralta
Note for Hearing--Denfendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Michael J Griffin
the claims of plantiff Peralta

1/6/2014
1/13/2014

:/16/2014

/21/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 01/21/2014
09:30 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Brief in opposition to partial summary judgment

Michael J Griffin

Affidavit of Eryn Krinitt Peralta

Michael J Griffin

Continued (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 01/16/2014 10:00 AM)
telephonic to Lewis County

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 1/16/2014
Time: 9:58 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole Kinzer
Tape Number:
Johanson
Carpenter

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on
01/16/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
telephonic to Lewis County

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on
01/16/2014 10:00 AM: Hearing Held telephonic to Lewis County

Michael J Griffin

Findings And Conclusions

Michael J Griffin

Summary Judgment

000U5

Michael J Griffin
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice
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Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate
1/21/2014

1/31/2014

Judge
Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Defendant; State Of Idaho
Department of Fish and Game, Defendant; Peralta, Eryn, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 1/21/2014

Michael J Griffin

Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment

Michael J Griffin

Memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion for Michael J Griffin
summary judgment
Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson in support of defendants' motion for Michael J Griffin
summary judgment
!/7/2014
!/13/2014

Notice Of Service of discovery

Michael J Griffin

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 04/16/2014 09:00

Michael J Griffin

AM)
'./28/2014
:/5/2014

/1/2014

Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Notice of taking deposition of Colin Sommer

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Service of discovery

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 04/16/2014 Michael J Griffin
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 04/01/2014 09:00 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Minute Order

Michael J Griffin

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 4/1/2014
Time: 9:02 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole Kinzer
Tape Number:
Carpenter
Johnson

Michael J Griffin

Continued (Jury Trial 09/22/2014 09:00 AM)

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Final Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 05/06/2014
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/01/2014 09:00 Michael J Griffin

AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/01/2014 09:00 Michael J Griffin
AM: Hearing Held

/16/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/06/2014 10:30
AM) 1st setting
2nd will be 5-22-2014 at 1030 a.m. if trial's go in Clearwater County

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Brief in opposition to motion for summary judgment

Michael J Griffin

Errata Exhibit A to certificate of attorney Peter J Johnson in support of
defendant's motion for summary judgment

Michael J Griffin
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice

Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate

Judge

i/28/2014

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/22/2014 10:30 AM)

5/2/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 05/05/2014 10:30 AM) tele in Michael J Griffin
Idaho County

;/5/2014

Michael J Griffin

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Errata Certification of Charles H Carpenter

Michael J Griffin

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/30/2014 10:00 AM}

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 05/05/2014 10:30 Michael J Griffin

AM: Hearing Held tele in Idaho County
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 05/05/2014 10:30 Michael J Griffin

AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
tele in Idaho County
i/8/2014

,/23/2014
/30/2014

Another Amended Notice Of Hearing

Michael J Griffin

Memorandum of points and authorities in response to plaintiffs brief in
opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment

Michael J Griffin

Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson regarding defendants' response
memorandum

Michael J Griffin

Defendants' Motion to strike affidavits

Michael J Griffin

Defendants' memorandum of authorities in support of motion to strkie the
affidavit of Larry Grandy

Michael J Griffin

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

Michael J Griffin

CERTIFICATION OF CHARLES H CARPENTER

Michael J Griffin

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 5/30/2014
Time: 9:30 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole Kinzer
Tape Number:
Peter Johnson--Defendant
Charles Carpenter--Plaintiff

Michael J Griffin

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/30/2014 Michael J Griffin
10:00 AM: Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/30/2014 Michael J Griffin
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
'2/2014

Notice of unavailability

Michael J Griffin

'7/2014

Findings And Conclusions

Michael J Griffin

Judgment

Michael J Griffin

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Defendant; State Of Idaho
Department of Fish and Game, Defendant; Krinitt, Perry, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 7n/2014

Michael J Griffin

00!JU7

)ate: 8/17/2016
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice
Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.

Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate

Judge

7

/7/2014

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/22/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Michael J Griffin
Vacated

'/9/2014

Michael J Griffin
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Jones Brower & Callery Receipt number: 0000987
Dated: 7/9/2014 Amount: $6.00 (Cashiers Check)

1/11/2014

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Carpenter, Charles H (attorney for Krinitt, Perry) Receipt number:
0001160 Dated: 8/11/2014 Amount: $129.00 (Cashiers Check) For:
Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff)

Michael J Griffin

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1161 Dated 8/11/2014 for 1163.00)

Michael J Griffin

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Michael J Griffin

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Michael J Griffin

Appeal Filed In District Court

Michael J Griffin

:/26/2014

Request for entry of Final Judgment

Michael J Griffin

1/3/2014

Judgment

Michael J Griffin

1/9/2014

Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL

Michael J Griffin

'/29/2014

Bond Converted (Transaction number 199 dated 9/29/2014 amount
143.00)

Michael J Griffin

0/6/2014

Acknowledgement Of Service

Michael J Griffin

0/14/2014

Request for additional record

Michael J Griffin

0/24/2014

Order for additional record

Michael J Griffin

0/27/2014

Objection to record

Michael J Griffin

Notice Of Hearing on objection to record on appeal

Michael J Griffin

Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/29/2014 02:00 PM) in Idaho County

Michael J Griffin

0/30/2014

1/4/2014

Hearing result for Objection scheduled on 10/29/2014 02:00 PM:
Held in Idaho County

Hearing Michael J Griffin

Court Minutes

Michael J Griffin

Order

Michael J Griffin

Bond Converted (Transaction number 226 dated 11/4/2014 amount
718.60)

Michael J Griffin

Bond Converted (Transaction number 227 dated 11/4/2014 amount
301.40)

Michael J Griffin

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Transcripts For Appeal Per Michael J Griffin
Page Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt number: 0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014
Amount: $717.50 (Cashiers Check)

1/10/2014
'20/2015

Miscellaneous Payment: Fax Fee Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt number:
0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014 Amount: $1.00 (Cashiers Check)

Michael J Griffin

Miscellaneous Payment: Misc. Overage Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt
number: 0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014 Amount: $.10 (Cashiers Check)

Michael J Griffin

Acceptance Of Service--Johnson

Michael J Griffin

Acceptance Of Service--Carpenter

Michael J Griffin

Change Assigned Judge (batch process)

00008

)ate;)3{17/2016
rime
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice

Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate

Judge

10/2/2015

Opinion 2015-89

Gregory Fitzmaurice

10/26/2015

Remittitur

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Remanded

Gregory Fitzmaurice

0/29/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 11/19/2015 03:00 PM)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

1/3/2015

Notice of scheduling conference

Gregory Fitzmaurice

1/19/2015

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 11/19/2015
Time: 2:57 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole
Tape Number:
Carpenter
Johnson

Gregory Fitzmaurice

1/20/2015

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 11/19/2015 03:00 Gregory Fitzmaurice

PM: Hearing Held
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 11/19/2015 03:00 Gregory Fitzmaurice
PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
1/24/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/17/2016 09:00 AM)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Order to mediate

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Scheduling Order

Gregory Fitzmaurice

2/30/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 01/13/2016 10:00 AM) Mediation Gregory Fitzmaurice
issues

/13/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 1/13/2016
Time: 10:15 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole
Tape Number:
Johnson and Carpenter

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/13/2016 10:00 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
Mediation issues
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/13/2016 10:00 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice
Hearing Held Mediation issues
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 01/22/2016 11:30 AM)
'19/2016

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/22/2016 11 :30 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice
Hearing Vacated
Order for mediation

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Dat~,,·-~17/2016

Second JudiciaV"~trict Court - Lewis County

Timt.. . J:27 AM
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Case: CV-2012-0000146 Current Judge: Gregory Fitzmaurice

Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate
3/21/2016

Judge
Motion for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendants' motion for Gregory Fitzmaurice
summary judgment and on the basis of statutory immunity
Affidavit of Peter J Johnson

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Notice Of Hearing--Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis Gregory Fitzmaurice
of statutory immunity
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/02/2016 09:00
AM)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

U15/2016

Brief in opposition to motion for summary judgment

Gregory Fitzmaurice

i/25/2016

Defendants' reply Memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgement

Gregory Fitzmaurice

5/2/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 5/2/2016
Time: 8:56 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Keith Evans
Minutes Clerk: Nicole Kinzer
Tape Number:
Charles Carpenter
Peter Johnson

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/02/2016 Gregory Fitzmaurice
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/02/2016 Gregory Fitzmaurice
09:00 AM: Hearing Held
l/1/2016

Summary judgment Memorandum order

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Judgment

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, Gregory Fitzmaurice
Defendant; Krinitt, Perry, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/1/2016
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 10/17/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Gregory Fitzmaurice
Vacated
Defendants Motion For Reconsideration Of A Portion Of The summary
Judgment Memorandum Order And Judgment

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Defendants Memorandum Of Authorities In Support Of Motion For
Reconsideration Of A Portion Of The Summary Judgment Memorandum
Order And Judgment

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Affidavit Of Peter J Johnson

Gregory Fitzmaurice

i/16/2016

Verified Memorandum of costs and attorneys fees

Gregory Fitzmaurice

i/20/2016

Defendants' motion to disallow a portion of plaintiffs costs and attorney fees Gregory Fitzmaurice

i/13/2016

/21/2016

Defendants' Memorandum in support of motion to disallow certain of
plaintiff's submitted costs and attorneys fees

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/08/2016 10:00 AM)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory Fitzmaurice

00 flt O
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Perry Krinitt, etal. vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, etal.
Perry Krinitt, Eryn Peralta vs. State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, State Of Idaho

Personal Injury
)ate
5/29/2016

7/8/2016

'/11/2016

'/21/2016

Judge
Memorandum in opposition to motion to disallow certain costs

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Affidavit of Charles H Carpenter

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Memorandum in opposition to motion to reconsider

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Affidavit of Charles H Carpenter

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 7/8/2016
Time: 10:54 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Nicole Kinzer
Tape Number:
Carpenter
Jonhson

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/08/2016 10:00 AM: Hearing
Held

Gregory Fitzmaurice

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Agreed upon calculations with respect to fees and costs

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Carpenter, Charles H (attorney for Krinitt, Perry) Receipt number:
0001029 Dated: 7/11/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Cashiers Check) For:
Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1030 Dated 7/11/2016 for 400.00)

Gregory Fitzmaurice

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Order denying motion to reconsider

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Attorney fees order

Gregory Fitzmaurice

Judgment

Gregory Fitzmaurice
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PETER J. JOHNSON, ISB #4105
Johnson Law Group, P.S.
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
Ph: (509) 835-5000
Fax: (509) 326-7503
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
PERRY KRINITT,
Plaintiff,

NO. CV 12-146

v.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE BASIS OF STATUTORY
IMMUNITY

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Peter J. Johnson and
Johnson Law Group, and move the Court for an order dismissing this action as a matter oflaw. This
motion is made pursuant to the memorandum of authorities and affidavit of attorney filed in support
of this motion and the pleadings on file herein.
DATED:

MarchlJ, 2016.
JOHNSON LAW GROUP

,,.,--

,/

/'

B*

-j-~

PETERJ.JO
Attorney for Defendants

0001~
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· I

JOHNSON LAW GROUP
I 03 E Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

·7 16.-

/ _ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a copy of the
1 hereby certify that on this _
foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Charles H. Carpenter
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins Avenue, Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802
Phone: (406) 543-0511
Fax:
(406) 258-0365

[X]
·[ ]
[ ]
·[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Federal Express

00013
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

JOHNSON L'\W GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503

Lewis County District Court

'"'"Ii

~ ..~

D

AfM~~~ocK{}_M

Charles H. Carpenter
Idaho Bar No. 8322
Carpenter Law Firm pk
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 543-0511
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com

APR 1 5 2016

Attorney far Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LEWIS COUNTY

PERRY KRINITT
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAHO,

________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV 12-146

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Five years into this case, years after the deadlines for raising its affirmative
defenses whether by answer, by amendment, or by motion for summary judgment,
the Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("Fish & Game") has decided to assert that it
was the "statutory employer" of plaintiff Perry Krinitt's ("K.rinitt") son, the decedent
Perry Krinitt ("Perry"). As is discussed in more detail below, this affirmative defense
is inapplicable as a matter of both law and fact. Even if this defense might lie,

1

00014

moreover, it has been waived by defendants in this case. For one or both of these
reasons, the Court should deny Fish & Game's motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Perry, a very experienced helicopter pilot, was killed when an employee of Fish

& Game negligently let her clipboard exit the cockpit and strike the tail rotor. See

Krinitt v. Department if Fish & Game, 357 P.3d 850 (Idaho 2015). Perry was at the time
an employee of Leading Edge Aviation LLC, which was under contract with a United
States government agency - the Department of Interior ("DOI") -- to provide certain
flight services to DOI and other entities, including Fish & Game. The Leading Edge
contract was part of DO I's nationwide Aviation Management program. In its
appropriations request for fiscal year 2010, DOI explained the purposes of the
program as follows:
The Aviation Management Directorate (AMD) provides safe, efficient, and
cost-effective aircraft to accomplish Department of the Interior missions.
Much of this activity involves unique and potentially hazardous flight profiles
such as law enforcement, aerial fire fighting, low-level wildlife surveys, and
placement of scientific personnel in remote locations. Safety is of paramount
importance in executing these missions.
In addition to providing aviation services through the Departmental Working
Capital Fund, AMD coordinates Interior's aviation policy oversight and system
management. This structure provides an independent safety overview of bureau
aviation programs by an office removed from direct bureau mission pressure.
Additionally, this effort provides Department wide direction of the aviation
management program.
Coordination between AMD and the bureaus is accomplished through
individual bureau aviation managers, the National Fire and Aviation Executive
Board, the National Interagency Aviation Council, the Fire Executive Council,
2
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and various other boards and committees. This centralized approach to
aviation service delivery and policy development and oversight extends to each
bureau, avoiding unnecessary aviation management duplication.
US DOI Budget Justifications FY 2010, Office of the Secretary, Department-Wide
Programs, at D0-121. The contract is structured as a fixed fee for services contract,
thus DOI did not reimburse Leading Edge for specific costs, such as workers
compensation insurance premiums.
Contrary to the inference Fish & Game wishes the Court to draw, there was no
contract between Leading Edge and Fish & Game. Nor, as is clear from the
documents and the goals of this national federal program, does DOI act as a
contractor "under" Fish & Game.
Within the time set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act (IC§ 6-905), I<rinitt
filed an administrative claim with Fish & Game (served on the Secretary of State).
The purpose of this filing requirement is to "(1) save needless expense and litigation
by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between

parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury
in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to
prepare defenses." Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27 (1991) (quoting Farber v.

State, 102 Idaho 398,401 (1981)). If, as it now seems to believe, Fish & Game was
Perry's statutory employer, this would have been the time for it to so inform Krinitt.
Certainly, all the material facts asserted by Fish & Game in its motion were known to
it at this time. Instead, Fish & Game said nothing.
3
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On August 30, 2012, Krinitt filed this action. Under I.R.C.P. Rules 8(c) and
12(b), Fish & Game was required to set forth its affirmative defenses in its answer. It
did not assert that it was the statutory employer of Perry. Instead, it proceeded to
defend the case on the merits, developing through costly and time-consuming
depositions facts it hoped to use to defend the case on the elements of Krinitt's
negligence claim. The Court ordered deadline for amending pleadings (February 2013
- fully two years after Krinitt had filed his administrative claim) came and went
without Fish & Game raising any additional affirmative defenses. A copy of the
contract between Leading Edge and DOI was produced in discovery. Numerous Fish
& Game employees, including the regional supervisor, were deposed concerning the
accident. None ventured a theory that Perry was colorably a statutory employee of
Fish&Game.
Krinitt traveled to Spokane, Washington to be deposed- at considerable
expense and inconvenience - and still Fish & Game made no mention of the
contention that it was, or even might be, Perry's statutory employer. Fact discovery
closed at the end of September 2013: because Perry's status as a virtual employee of
Fish & Game had never been raised, Krinitt did not take any discovery from DOI
concerning whether DOI, contrary to the sense of its separate contracts with Leading
Edge and Fish & Game, considered itself a contractor "under" Fish & Game. 1

1

Discovery from federal officials in a state civil matter is subject to the rule of United States ex rel
Touf?y v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), and not lightly undertaken. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.81 & 2.84.

4
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Krinitt engaged experts, incurring tens of thousands of dollars in fees, who
offered opinions on the elements of his negligence claim. Fish & Game also engaged
an expert - Fish & Game's expert made no mention of a statutory employer defense,
but instead addressed the merits of Krinitt's negligence claim offering an opinion that
Leading Edge was at fault for the accident. Krinitt engaged a further expert (again at
very considerable expense) who submitted a rebuttal report, showing that for a
number of reasons, the Fish & Game's expert's conclusions were unfounded.
Fish & Game moved for summary judgment on January 31, 2014, the Court
ordered deadline for filing such motions. It did not raise any issue pertaining to
immunity, but instead argued the elements of I<rinitt's negligence claim. After the
motion was filed, but before I<rinitt's response was due, the parties each took the
deposition of the other's principal liability expert - both depositions were in Denver,
and, again, Krinitt incurred considerable costs. I<rinitt responded to the summary
judgment motion, and Fish & Game filed a reply brief, again never hinting that it had
a defense of immunity. The Court- then Judge Griffin - heard oral argument, which,
again, focused on the elements of negligence and the facts relevant to them; no
mention was made by Fish & Game of any immunity defense. The Court granted the
motion, issuing an opinion that was confined to the elements of I<rinitt's negligence
claim. The Court made no mention of any immunity defense.
Krinitt appealed to the Supreme Court. Fish & Game did not raise statutory
employer immunity as an alternate ground for affirmance, nor did it make any
5
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mention of this defense in its brief. Neither Fish & Game, nor any justice, made any
mention of statutory employer immunity at oral argument, nor was there any mention
of this defense in the Supreme Court's opinion reversing the Court's grant of
summary judgment.
Likewise, Fish & Game made no mention of this defense when counsel
conferred prior to the scheduling conference with the Court, during the scheduling
conference, or during the later conference with the Court at which an allocation of
expenses for the Court ordered mediation was discussed. Fish & Game did not raise
the issue prior to Krinitt incurring significant costs and inconvenience (including
cancelling surgery to accommodate Fish & Game's schedule) in connection with the
mediation, or prior to travel to the mediation site, although it could have done so
without harm. Even now, it offers no excuse whatsoever for its failure to raise the
issue in a timely fashion.

ARGUMENT
A. Fish & Game was not the Statutory Employer of Perry
As Fish & Game itself recites, the heart of the workers compensation scheme is
a trade-off. In return for "sure and certain" compensation, without having to litigate
fault, the workers compensation statutes provide the exclusive remedy for claims
against an employer.2 This trade-off is only for the benefit of employers, however,

2

This trade-off is what makes the abrogation of remedies provisions of the workers compensation
scheme constitutional. See Venters v. Sorrento DeL, Inc., 141 Idaho 245,252 (2005). In the context of a

6
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and does not protect third-parties. I.C. § 72-223. Contractors and subcontractors
"under" an employer are included in the definition of employer for this purpose, I. C.

§ 72-216, and are therefore not third parties. It has long been recognized that the
statutory definition of employer used here is not merely broader than common
understanding, but broader than the common law definition. The key element, rather
than control (as it would be under the common law), is privity:

The relation thus established is purely statutory. The legislature for the purpose
of the compensation act created the relation of employer and employee
between independent groups who never before had borne, and who do not
now under the common law bear that relation to each other. It forces liability
upon parties who are in priviry of contract.

Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590,593 (1979) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court's decision in Ruffing v. Ada Counry Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943 (2008), is directly
on point: without privity, there simply is no statutory employer relationship. As noted
above, this emphasis on privity is made explicit in the statute. I.C. § 72-216. In order
to prove it was Perry's employer, then, Fish & Game must show tl1at Leading Edge,
and DOI, were contractors "under" Fish & Game.

This emphasis on privity directly serves the purpose of the statutory scheme.
"[T]he Idaho Code sections dealing with the concept of statutory employer 'are

non-dependent parent's case, the trade-off is pure illusion: in return for giving up the cause of action
provided for him in section 5-311 of the Idaho Code - under which he may claim only damages for
his own injury, and not those of his son, see Pfau v. Comair Holdings, 135 Idaho 152 (2000)-Krinitt is
provided exactly nothing. See Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763 (1969).
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designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability under the workmen's
compensation statutes by sub-contracting the work to others."' Venters, 141 Idaho at
251 (quoting Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 860 (2002), and Adam v.

Titan Equipment Supp!J Co., 93 Idaho 644, 646 (1970)). While the Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that bad motive must be shown before an entity may be an
employer, Gonzalez v. L.amb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 123 (2005), it is entirely
appropriate to scrutinize the contracts between the parties with the purposes of the
statutory program in mind. Even privity may not be enough to create a statutory
employer, depending on the character of the contracts. See, e.g., Harpole v. State, 131
Idaho 437 (1998). There is no authority, though, and certainly none cited by Fish &
Game, for going outside the bounds of actual privity in finding that some entity or
other is a statutory employer. See also Baugh v. Gale Lim Holdings, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96658 (Dist. Idaho) (denying summary judgement when fact dispute existed as
to existence of contract).

It is not disputed that Perry was employed by Leading Edge, and was
performing at the time of the accident pursuant to Leading Edge's contract with DOI.
Fish & Game's new immunity theory only possibly works if Leading Edge is a
contractor under DOI and DOI is a contractor under Fish & Game. No case cited by
Fish & Game supports the latter point, nor indeed, does it fit either the structure of
the federal program, or the general relationship between states and the federal
8
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government. First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held
that the United States is not the statutory employer of the employees of government
contractors under the laws of Idaho. Kirk v. United States, 232 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1953).
This is sufficient to end the matter: the chains of liability and privity - which are the
basis for the statutory employer provision - are broken. Federal employees are not
included in the Idaho workers compensation scheme, but instead have their own
avenue for compensation under federal law. 3 Just as under the statutes reviewed in
Kirk, federal employees are excluded from the current Idaho scheme in at least two

ways: section 72-205 conspicuously omits federal employment from its definition of
"public employment," while section 72-212(7) exempts from coverage injuries where
federal law provides the remedy. Similarly, under the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy
Clause, the federal status of Leading Edge's contract takes it out of the scheme set up
in the Idaho Code. Krinitt could simply not have held Fish & Game liable under the
Idaho workers compensation statute had both Leading Edge and the DOI failed to
provide workers compensation coverage, because DOI had no obligation to provide
coverage under Idaho law, federal law, or any contract between DOI and Fish &
Game.

3

Congress can subject, and has subjected, certain federal employees and contractors to state workers
compensation schemes. This legislation does not cover Perry. In addition, a federal agency can be a
statutory employer when, under a cost reimbursable contract, it has paid the workers compensation
of its contractor's premiums. See Stmhs v. Protective Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715 (1999). DO I's
contract with Leading Edge was not cost reimbursement, but was fixed fee.

9
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Leading Edge was not a contractor of Fish & Game. Because the United States
is a supreme, sovereign entity, DOI is not either in fact or in law a contractor "under"
Fish & Game, and thus Leading Edge is not a subcontractor under Fish & Game,

within the meaning of sections 72-216 and 72-223. Under its contract with DOI, for
example, Leading Edge's remedies for contract claims were under the federal Contract
Disputes Act. Contract, 1 C.1, incorporating 48 C.F.R. 52.212-4(d) (attachment 2 to
Johnson Aff. at LEA001468). Leading Edge could not have had any remedies in
contract against Fish & Game. Claims arising in tort against DOI, or, indeed, against
Leading Edge, would also be controlled by federal law, see Bqyle v. United Technologies

Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1988), and would need to have been brought in the
appropriate forum. Fish & Game's tort liability here is based on its employee's fault,
pursuant to Idaho Code 6-903, and could never have been based on its purported
"employment" of DOI, and, through DOI, of Leading Edge under Idaho Code 72216 and Spencer v. Allpress Logging, 134 Idaho 856 (2000), had Leading Edge not
participated in the workers comp program.
Potential employer liability is not merely the statutory basis for immunity, it is
also the basis for the constitutionality for the workers compensation scheme. As the
Supreme Court explained in Venters,
In return for fixing absolute liability on the primary contractor or operator of
the facility (including making sure the primary operator only uses contractors
who comply with the Act), Section 8 of the Act grants to the primary
contractor or operator of a facility immunity from suits under the common law.
The quid pro quo under the Act still exists because I.C. § 72-223's_grant of
10

immunity comes only in connection with absolute liability on the part of the
primary contractor or business operator to provide benefits under the Act if
the employee's direct employer fails to do so. The fact that the primary
employer may keep § 72-223's grant of immunity even though the direct
employer has paid benefits and fulfilled its obligations under the law does not
render the statute unconstitutional.
141 Idaho at 252. In the circumstances here, because the liability chain between
Leading Edge's employees and Fish & Game is broken by the federal character of the
contracts each has ·with DOI, and by DOI's own federal identity, application of
statutory employer immunity would be a due process violation.
That is, whether one traces the purported privity chain from Fish & Game, or
the purported liability stream from Leading Edge, DOI sits athwart both chains,
breaking them both.
Idaho was not the employer of Perry, any more than it is the employer of any
convenience store employee who might wait on a state employee, even if the plain
language of the statute might be stretched to cover such a situation. This is true even
if the convenience store employee is directed to serve such customers as appear in the
store - and may be directed to help specific customers load groceries in their cars, or
to pump gas into a customer's car at the store's gas pumps - but this does not create
the chain of privity or liability required by the Idaho Code. Similarly, the Southwest
Airlines pilot who flew Fish & Game's counsel to California for the mediation in this
case, although his employer was paid by the state to do so, was not a statutory
employee of the State of Idaho.
11
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Leading Edge may have had more of a relationship to Fish & Game than
Southwest Airlines, but no contract was produced in discovery or attached to the
motion, and indeed, none exists, that makes Fish & Game the statutory employer of
Perry. More fundamentally, this works no injustice: nothing about t~e arrangements
between Fish & Game and DOI on the one hand, and between Leading Edge and
DOI on the other, were designed to allow Fish & Game to evade liability for Leading
Edge's employees. They are, rather, designed to meets the needs of a nationwide
federal program. Thus, both the language and the purpose of the statutory employer
provision are inapplicable here.
Fish & Game's burden on a motion for summary judgment was to show that
Leading Edge was, without question or dispute, a contractor or subcontractor
"under" Fish & Game. If the contracts show otherwise, or if there is even some
ambiguity on the issue, summary judgment must be denied. The evidence Fish &
Game has appended to its motion do not sufficiently and indisputably support its
position.
Even if the immunity defense had not been waived - and it clearly has been - it
cannot be invoked by Fish & Game in the circumstances of this case. Summary
judgment should be denied.

B. The Statutory Employer Immunity Affirmative Defense has been Waived
That statutory employer immunity is an affirmative defense that can be waived
by failure to timely present it was conclusively established by the Supreme Court in
12
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Fuhriman v State, 143 Idaho 800, 803-04 (2007). 4 That Fish & Game has waived the

defense here is equally conclusively established by its conduct: not only did Fish &
Game fail to raise the defense at the various opportunities available to it (including
some that are mandatory under the rules) - (a) investigation of Krinitt's administrative
complaint; (b) its answer; (c) an amendment filed by the Court-ordered deadline for
amending pleadings; (d) its motion for summary judgment filed on the deadline for
motions for summary judgment; (e) the appeal before the Supreme Court -it has
instead elected, and thereby compelled Krinitt, to litigate the merits of his negligence
claim.
As noted above, and repeatedly by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the
workers compensation scheme is to create a "sure and certain" method for injured
employees to assert their claims without having to prove fault, and, in return for this
"sure and certain" system, to immunize employers from litigation. Allowing Fish &
Game to assert an immunity defense after forcing I<rinitt to incur tens of thousands
of dollars of costs and litigate fault for years, including before the Supreme Court, is
the direct antithesis of the result sought by the legislature. It is clear from the holding
of Fuhriman that Fish & Game had the legal right to litigate the merits of Krinitt's

4

Fish & Game characterizes the statutory employer immunity defense in its brief as "jurisdictional,"
Br. at 5 (citing Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho162 (1987)), but this is clearly wrong. Nothing
in Rhodes lends any support to this characterization, but even if it did, the holding in Fuhriman would
have overruled it.
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negligence claim rather than to assert an immunity defense: this is what deciding that
an affirmative defense is waivable means.
Thus, Fish & Game had an option: litigate the elements of Krinitt's negligence
claim, or assert its immunity defense, providing the "sure and certain" relief. It has

certainly litigated fault in this case. What Fuhriman does not stand for, nor any other
authority cited by Fish & Game, is the proposition that a party can litigate fault all the
way to the Supreme Court and then, only when it has lost on its contentions regarding
fault, emerge from the weeds with a new affirmative defense. 5
The Supreme Court noted in Fuhriman, as in Bluestone, that an affirmative
defense may first be raised on summary judgment because the Rules allow pleadings
to be amended, and amendment is fairly permissive. Parties do not have unlimited
rights to amend, however. Under Rule 16, the Court was required to set a deadline for
amendments of the pleadings, and for summary judgment motions. It did so with
respect to both here. Under Rule 16(b), these deadlines may not be modified absent a
showing of good cause. None has been shown. Rules 15 and 56 each include timing
provisions, and in both, a scheduling order from the Court is controlling. Fish &

5

In Fuhriman, the Supreme Court followed its holding in Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453
(1982), allowing an affu:tnative defense first raised in a timely motion for summary judgment. The
Blues tone court had carefully distinguished a defense raised for the first time on appeal - citing
Paloukos v. Intennountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740 (1978) - and relied on I.R.C.P. Rule 1(a)'s
instruction that the Rules are to "be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding ..." 103 Idaho at 455. Allowing Fish & Game to
assert its waived affirmative defense at this. late date is in no way faithful to Rule 1.

14

Game's motion does not meet these deadlines, and does not even attempt to argue
good cause.
Even when the deadline is extended, as these deadlines have not been, a party
that wishes to amend its pleading must still obtain leave of court. This is not
automatic either, but is dependent on certain factors not being present.
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely
given.'

DAFCO UC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 755 (2014) (quoting Smith v
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272 (1977)). In addition to simple timeliness,
[a]ppropriate factors to consider include whether the proposed amendment
would delay upcoming hearings or trial, whether the motion to amend comes
after court-imposed deadlines have passed, and whether substantial work has
already been completed.... For example, in Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., the
plaintiff filed motions to amend several months after the deadline for filing
motion to amend pleadings had passed. 141 Idaho 604, 613, 114 P.3d 974, 983
(2005). There, "the district court stated: 'We are now two years into this case,
the time to amend pleadings has passed, and two discovery deadlines have
expired. It is now simply too late to further amend the substance of the
pleadings .... " Id.

Id. at 756-57. Here, amendment is futile, for the reasons made clear in the foregoing
section of the brief. Fish & Game's delay was certainly undue - the deadline for
amendments expired more than 3 years ago, and the deadline for filing motions for
summary judgment passed more than 2 years ago - while in the interim Krinitt, and
two courts, were actively litigating fault. Fact discovery is long closed, precluding
15
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Krinitt from getting confirmation from federal officials that DOI is not a contractor
"under" Fish & Game. Clearly, a great deal of work has gone into this case, including
appellate review of merits Fish & Games now contends are irrelevant. These are
sufficient bases to deny leave to amend (or otherwise assert the defense). In contrast,
the Supreme Court found that a three year late amendment to assert an affirmative
defense was permissible in West v. El Paso Products, 122 Idaho 133, 135 (1992), but only
because the defendant made its motion as soon as it learned of the facts underlying its
defense. Here all the material facts asserted by Fish & Game were known to Fish &
Game when Krinitt filed his administrative claim, more than 5 years ago.
But the most compelling reason for denying amendment is the undue prejudice
that amendment would visit on Krinitt: he has invested time and money, heart and
soul, in this litigation as structured by Fish & Game's decision to contest fault. His
approach would have been substantially different had Fish & Game timely raised its
contention in a timely manner. So too would the Court's approach, and that of the
Supreme Court. For this (apparently, in Fish & Game's view) vast waste of Krinitt's
time and money, and the time of this court and of the Supreme Court, Fish & Game
offers neither explanation nor apology. Amendment may be permissive under the
rules, but the Court should not allow it to be abusive.
In all the circumstances here, it is simply too late to allow Fish & Game to
assert a previously waived affirmative defense by motion for summary judgment. The
Court can and should exercise its discretion to so hold.

16

00029

C. In the Alternative, if the Court Permits Fish & Game to Assert Statutory
Immunity, the Court should Award Krinitt Costs
Rule 15(a) not only enjoins the Court to deny leave to amend when doing so
does not serve the interests of justice - and denial is entirely appropriate in this case,
as noted in the preceding section of the brief - it also has the explicit authority to
award costs to the non-moving party, as a way of mitigating the harm it has suffered
in litigating a superseded version of the case. These costs may include attorneys fees.

Curtis v. Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 31 (1986). Krinitt would much prefer that the Court
reject Fish & Game's abusive last minute attempt to assert its long-since waived
immunity defense in this case, and believes that failure to do so would be an abuse of
discretion. In the alternative, however, he requests that if the Court allows Fish &
Game to assert immunity at this point in the case, he be awarded costs including
expert fees (as were necessarily incurred in the particular circumstances of this case,
not merely to the extent allowed as of right in Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(8)), attorneys fees,
costs associated with the mediation6, filing and service fees, and all other costs
incurred in the prosecution of this action. This would apply whether The Court grants
the motion for summary judgement, or denies it leaving the genuine issue of material
fact as to the existence of a contractual arrangement sufficient to make Leading Edge
"under" Fish & Game. Should the Court adopt this alternative, Krinitt can submit a
bill of costs in a timely fashion following its ruling to that effect.
6

Failure to assert its immunity defense prior to allowing I<.rinitt to incur the expense and
inconvenience of the Court-ordered mediation was certainly bad faith.

17
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Krinitt requests that the Court deny Fish & Game's
motion for summary judgment.
DATED THIS 13th day of April, 2016.

Respectfully subfnitted
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Johnson Law Group
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRI T OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF LE IS
PERRY KRINlIT,
Plaintiff,
V.

NO. CV 12-146
DEFENDANTS' REP Y

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,

1\l!EMORANDUM IN UPPORT OF
MOTION FORS
Y
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants' (hereinafter "IDFG") motion is premised upon its qualifi ation as a statutory
employer pursuant to the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"). In order t guarantee orkev' s
compensation coverage, Idaho employs a statutory scheme allowing an injured orker to 1 ok to all
entities in the line of hire, as far back as the genesis of the job if necessary, too tain cover ge. This

1

look back for coverage is provided regardless of questions of fault and ofthe r lation of
to each other. The quid pro quo for this avenue to
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compensation is provided to the exclusion of every other remedy, except for · ited circ
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tan<;es

expressly provided for in the act. Therefore, each entity along the line of hire s immune from t~rt

actions because of this exclusive remedy rule. Those entities are charac rized as
employers" for the purposes of worker's compensation. Based upon the st lutes

·t1atutqry

refer

/n

IDFG' s supporting brief, IDFGwa.s a statutory employer ofPerry J. Krinitt, Jr., 'Krinitt") and, thus,

is immune from any tort action arising from his work-related injuries under

exclusiJ remedy

rule.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS.
In opposition to IDFG's motion, Plaintiff argues three points; 1) IDF
;

argue that it is a statutory employer; 2) IDFG did not have a contract with Le

Edge viation

("'Leading Edge'') and, therefore, IDFG cannot be Krinitt's statutory employer;

eoftbe

"federal status" of. the contract, Idaho's worker's compensation laws do not apply. The~e
contentions find no support in the law.
B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF STATUTORYEMPL

IS APPROPRlATE.

1.

The Issue Is Time

ether It Is One Of Jurisdic ·

The courts have held that the issue of immunity as a statutory emplo er is eithe one ?f
jurisdiction or one of an affirmative defense. See Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co.,
742 P.2d 417 (1987) (relief for injured workmen and their families is provide to the exc\rusion of
every other remedy and civil causes of action and all jurisdiction of the courts o the state oiVer su~h

JO

DEFENDANTS' REPLY M:EMORANPUM IN SUPPORT

SON LAW pROUP

03 B. Indiana, §Uite A .
S bnc, WA 9J7•23I7 !
TEL: (S09) 3S-SOOO F

OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU))OMENT - 2

00034

I;
I

(S09) ~26-7S03

.

PAGE

LAW Lit-FICES

04/25

causes is abolished); and Fuhriman v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 8 3-04, 153 .3d 4~0
(2007) (immunity through qualification as a statutory employer is an affinna · e defense .

It is well-established law that subject matter jurisdiction is never wai ed and th t lack :of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime. Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 34 , 336 P.3d 275, 278

(2014); see also Doe v. Doe (In re Ttirmination of Parental Rights of Doe), 58 Idaho 14, 616
(:W 15). In addition, it is well-settled Idaho law that !he issue of statutory emp yer ~ t y <My

be raised as an affirmative defense for the first time by summary judgment moti n at any p int prior
to trial, so long as the opposing party is provided time to respo0:d to the mo on. Fuhri an, 14 3
Idaho at 803-04. Idaho law is clear that IDFG' s motion, whether termed as a j isdiction issue pr
as an affirmative defense, is appropriate and timely.
2.

The Issue Was Not Waived.

Plaintiff argues that IDFG waived the issue of whether it was a statuto

employer because

it did not plead the issue as an affirmative defense or raise the issue on appeal

d that to \ow raife

it requires a motion to amend the pleadings. As discussed above, if the statuto

employelissue i. s

one of subject matter jurisdiction, it may never be waived and it may be raised t any time BairclSalla:z, 157 Idaho at 345. If the issue is an affinnative defense, IDFG's answer led the af nnative
defense that "Plaintiffs have foiled to state a claim upon which relief can be btained."
Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand, pg. 3. Furthennore, the affmnative efense of

f=J,,

itatutory

employer immunity may be raised for the first time on a motion for summary j gment. F\hriman,
143 Idaho at 803-04. A motion to amend pleadings is neither necessary norm dated.

1

Plaintiff cited Fuhriman for the proposition that "anaffinnative defense .. can be
failure to timely present il" Opposition Brief, pg. 12. However, Fuhriman do
JO
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proposition and, in fact, clearly holds otherwise as to the statutory employer i

unity i sue. The

appellants in Fuhriman argued that the statutory employer immunity was waiv

because was ~ot
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J

raised in the pleadings. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that the issue may
for the first time on summary judgment. The Court's holding is on point with

le

raised

uppo~

IDFG's present motion.
Fuhriman was employed by Multiple Concrete Enterprises, Inc. {Multip e), which

f8 hired

by the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation {State) to provide work on a road conktructibn
project in Oneida County, Idaho. An accident occurred killing and injuring s eral of Jultiple's
employees. Fuhriman' s family members, among others, brought a wrongful dea
suit against the State. The State filed a motion for summary judgment assertin
as a statutory employer because it had contracted with Fuhriman' s employ , Multiple. for the
project. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed:

[T]his Court has held that an affmnative defense :may be raised r the first
time on a motion for summary judgment. Bluestone v. Mathewson, IO Idaho
455, 649P.2d 12091211 (1982).Inthatcasetheplaintifffiledamotion rsummary
judgment alleging a defense she did not plead in her reply to the defen ant's cross[
complaint. We recogni:z:ed that some federal circuit courts have held that party mus~
plead affirmative defenses. However, we declined to follow that 1i e of case~.
Though we noted an affumative defense cannot be raised for the rst time o'
appeal, we held "that where the defense was raised before tr· l and the
defendant was given time to present argument in opposition, the d ense ... c~
be raised for the first time in the summary judgment motion. 11 Id.

451

l

The issue then becomes whether the defense was raised before trial and hether th 1
defendant was given time to argue in opposition 1:o the defense. The S te's
Motion for Summary Judgment does not mention immunity. It moved r
judgment on the basis that Appellants failed to state a claim upon whic reliefma
be granted. The State filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment concurrently with its Motion for Summary Judgm t.

actu1
sutnmarz
1
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stauJ

The State's Memorandum clearly alerts Appell- as to its position that a
employer it is immune from statutory liability. Ten days later, the Ap ellants :filel:l
their reply brief discussing statutory employer immunity and asserting at the Sta~
is not a statutory employer. Debate over statutory employer immunity ontinued
the hearing held on the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. The arties then
submitted additional briefing to the court. Thus, the Bluestone req · ement tbJt
"the defendant was given time to present argument in oppositio " was met,
Appellants were alerted to the immunity defense by the M morandu'
accompanying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and ad time to
respond and present their opposing argument.

ip

Therefo.-e, we hold summary judgment was proper and that the S
waive its affirmative defense of immunity.

Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 803-04 (emphasis added). See also, Patterson v. Stat
Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,316,256 P.3d 718, 724(2011) (party does not waive an affinnative defense
for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial an

gparty

has time to respond in briefing and oral argument).
Plaintiff argues that IDFG should have raised the issue of statutory em layer

junity m

the appeal brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs appeal concerned the sole issue of w ether IDF! shouid
have been granted summary judgment upon the basis that speculation was req · d to dis em who
had control of the clipboard prior to it exiting the helicopter. IDFG responded to ·s issue o appe!'!,l.
However, contrary to Plaintiff's argument and pursuant to Fuhriman, IDFG c uld not haJe raised

it

1he statutozy immunity issue on appeal. However, is appropriate for JDFG

t raise the irue in a

motion for summary judgment.

\

·•

Plaintifffurther contends that the Court in Fuhriman based its holding o the permissiveness
ofthe rules allowi~g amendment of pleadings. Opposition Brief, pg. 14, To the ontrary, F~hriman

I
held:
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Since Bluestone controls, the Court need not reach the State's argumen that even i
it is required to plead the defense of immunity, the failure to do so is h
due to liberal pleading amendment rules.

ess erro1

Id. at 804.
The law is clear that IDFG,s summary judgment motion for dismi sal based pon its

inununity as a statutory employer for any claims arising from an on-the-job inj

of Leading Edg~' s

employee Perry J. Krinitt is appropriate.
C.

IDFG CONTRACTED WITH LEADING EDGE FOR SERVICES.

It is difficult to understand Plaintiffs argument that there was no contr ct between Leading
Edge and IDFG when the contract Leading Edge produced in discovery clear names IDFG

as a

party. Specifically:
CONTRACT LANGUAGE

BATES#

LEA-001444

"ACRONYMS AS USED THROUGHOUT'IHISCONIRA T AREAS
FOLLOWS:

IDFG Idaho Dept. of Fish & Game"

LEA-001447

''CLIENTS:

State of Idaho Fish & Gamet Dept."

LEA-001476

"SECTION C - TERMS AND CONDITIONS
C8.3 The nature of the services expected
der this
contract(s) will be to support a variety of DOI sers and
IDFG within the lower 48 United States. 11

See Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson, Attachment No. 3, pp. LEA-001444, 0 1447, and 001476
(emphasis added).
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Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72·102 (13)(a): "'Employer' meansanypers

xpres~ly

or impliedly hired or contracted tb.e services of another. It includes contractors

tors."

An employer who makes use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees q

ill.es as a category

eJB/25

'

one statutory employer and is immune from suits in tort Venters v. Sorrento el., Inc.,

T

! Idaho

245, 108 P .3d 392, 396 (2005). At the time ofthe accident, Leading Edge"'.85

viding aTlicoprer

and pilot, Krinitt, to IDFG to condu~t a salmon survey pursuant to its con

t with ID G. Had

Leading Edge failed to provide worker's compensation coverage to Krinitt,

initt and

would have been pennitted under Idaho statutes to claim coverage from IDFG

is1

fam~y

Krinitt' s rtuto:ry

employer. In providing this guarantee of coverage by allowing Krinitt to look b kin the · e ofhlre

to obtain coverage from an entity not his direct employer, the Idaho Legisla
exclusive remedy for workers injured on the job was worker's compensati
Legislature granted inununity to those defined as statutory employers. See I.C §§ 72-:20 , 72-2i 1
and 72-223.
Plaintiff further argues that IDFG hired DOI and that it was DOI that

Consequently, Plaintiff a,:gues there was no direct relationship between JDFG and Looig Edge.
Rather than this argument depicting a break in the chain that would terminate th statutory employer

analysis, it supports a fmding that there was a contractor/subcontractor relatio ship, a relJtions~p
the Courts have held does not extinguish statutory employer status. See Kola v. Cassia County,

Idaho, 142 Idaho 346,353 127 P.3d 962 (2005).
Kolar was employed by JUB Engineers, who was hired by Burley

·ghway Diftrict, to

provide engineering services on a road project for a U.S. Forest Service road. K lar, while

itl the job
I

:

site, was run over by a vehicle driven by a Burley Highway District employee. Burley an1 Albion
SON LAW ~ROUP
03 E. Indiana, Suite A
S kane:, WA 992,07-2317 •
TEL: (S09) 35-5000
(S09) 3:26-7503
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Highway Districts and Cassia County (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Highw y Districts') jointly
maintained the road wider a mainrenance agreement with the

U.S. Forest Servic and the Ut Forest

Service provided the funds for that maintenance. Kolar sued the Highway Di ·cts as t1,d parties
and the Highway Districts moved for

sununary judgment. The district co

Junun~

granted

judgment finding that the HighwayDistricts were Kolar's st,tuto,y em~loyers d immune ~m suit
Kolar appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holdi g that the highway

Districts were an "employer'' within 1he meaning of that tenn as fourul in I.C. 72-223(1

Lnd 1.C.

§ 72w216. See also Liberty Nort'hwest Ins. Corp. v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dis:l LEXIS
138291.The Supreme Court further held that there was no support for Kolar' argumen, that the
statute violated due process. Kolar, 142 Idaho 346.
Even under Plaintiff's scenario that IDFG contracted with DOI and OI contra ted with
Lea.ting Edge, IDFG is still be entitled to a statutory employer status beca,ise i would be

table for

worker's compensation coverage as an entity_m the line of hire Leadmg Ed e and its eFploy~e

j'
I

Krinitt.
l'laintiff argues that the facts of this case are analogous to the facts in

•

R mg v. A Counry

Paramedic;, 145 Idaho 943, 188 P.3d 885 (2008). However, Ruffing is cle ly disting1shab{e.

I tQ•a
Ruffing, the plaintiff, was a firefighter with the City of Boise. While on du , he responded
medical emergency call. The Ada Coun1y Paratnedics also responded to

same c.+ After

medical assistance had been rendered, the patient was loade~ into an ambulanc being dri en by an

1

Ada County Paramedics employee. As the ambulance was backing up to leave, i struck a patked

allegedly pinning Ruftlng between 1he two vehicles: Rufl:ing bro~ suit

ainst

A1

car,

County

Paramedics and its employee. Ada County filed a motion for summary Judgm t clam:ung, among

II
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other things, that it had statutory employer status because of the joint operatio

between

i
I
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.

and ~e

City of Boise. Although the agencies worked together, Ada County did not ontend thje was a
contractual relationship between them. The Court held that because there

no evidJnce of a

R,l/llngl the C!ly
of Boise Fire Department and the Ad.a Cowt:y Pata:medics simply responded o the saror call for

contract, there could be no statutozy employer relationship. Id., 145 Idaho at 947 In

medical assistance - there was no contractual relationship. In this case, even ccepting Pll.aintifr s

contentions arguendo, IDFG contracted with DOI, and DOI tbon contraoted "th ~ g Edge.

Ruffing is inapposite for application to the facts ofthis case. Construing the rela ionships i!this case
as they are clearly shown on the face of the contract, IDFG and DOI contract

with Lea · g Edge

for aviation services. Leading Edge undisputedly employed Krinitt as a pil
statutory employer of Krinitt.

D.

IMMUNITY IS NOT EXTINGIBSHED BY TIIE PRESENC

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (''DOI") IN THE CONTRACT

OF

J

u'.:. s.

Plaintiff argues that the "federal status of Leading Edge's conttact take it out of the scheme

set up in the Jdah<, Code" and tb,tt "[t]his is sufficient to end the matter." Op osition

B1f, pg.: 9.

Plaintiff cites a 1953 case for the proposition that the United States may not be statutory jmplo~er
under the laws ofldaho (Kirkv. United States, 232 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1953)). owever,

Is

is not

current law. The application ofldaho's worker's compensation laws to a Unit d States d~partment
was addressed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho in the unp blished d ision' of
Liberty Northwest Im. Corp. v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291 2011 WL 6002468

(copy attached), in which the Court held: "[S]tatutory employer immunity un er Idahd s

orker' s

J
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Compensation Act can apply to the United States.'' Id. at *9 (citing LaBarge v.

lln5

ariposa,

798 F.2d 364,367 (9th Cir. 1986).

Jn Liberty Northwest, a subrogation claim, Perkins, an employee ofExtr

e Electri , slip~

and fell on ice while exiting a work vehicle at Mountain Home Air Force B e. He suJmitted a

~!aim !or worker'~ compensation benefits with L~, Atreme El<ciric', w rker com,onsatiOn
msurer, which paid benefits. At the time of the accldent, Parsons Evergr ne was the general
contractor on a construction contract with the Anny Corps of Engineers on a roject at

Home Air Force Base. Parson subcontracted with Extreme Electric.

I

Jountain

In the subrogation action, Liberty, as subrogee of Extreme Electric and erkins, all ged that
the United States through the Department of Defense, the Department of

. I and.

e Air

FOircei

Mountain Home Air Force Base were responsible for and negligent in the remo al of sno4 and ice.
The Court in analyzing the statutory employer status of the defendants di not foe, on the
government as a whole or "monolithic entity,'' but instead examined the agen ies involv

1

in the

matter. Id. at *11. The Court found that there was no evidence connecting the Dep

ent 9f

Defense, the Air Force, or the Base to the general contractor or subcontractor ut rather \at if any
entity was entitled to claim statutory employer status, it was the Army Corps of ngineers, the entity
which contracted for the project. Id.

Plaintiff places undue emphasis on the term "under" and points to the

remaey

1he inclusion of1he United States DOI in the contract. In essence, Plaintiff ar es that
DOI is a federal agency, it swallows the presence of the IDFG in the contract

cir

,uid

,use

d erases

the

1·e IDFG

from the line of hire in a statutory employer analysis. Opposition Brieft pg. 11. laintiff s igument
I

fiiils here as it did for the U.S. Government in Liberly Northwest. When XaJllined tom the
JO NSON LAW pROUP

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION FOR StlMMARY JUDGMENT· 10

TEL:

03 E. Indiana,~ itc A
7-2317
: (509) 326-7503

s k:ane, WA 99
(509) 3S-sooo F

I
!i

00042

LAW Ut-t-lCl:.S

PAGE

viewpoint ofan injured WOiker whose direct employer failed to provide cover
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, Plainjs theo:'

would eliminate access to coverage. Plaintiff's theory in practice is that when U.S. Govfmment
department (e.g., DOI) is a party in a contract, regardless of other entities . the contrrt (e.g.~
IDFG), the line of hire stops at and includes only the U.S. Government entity ( .g.•

DOI)f

entity

to which, Plaintiff argues, the !doh<> worker's compensation law.a do not appl . 'Ilus is s" ply not

the law.

,

Plaintiff urges this Court to hold that IDFG did not hire the services o Leading lge, and

thus the services of Leading Edge's employee Krinitt, despite IDFG control · g the
Leading Edge for the flight, and contracting with Leading Edge for aviation s

flighl, paying

ices. See .Affi,davit

of Peter J. Johnso~ Attachment No. 2, pg. 4. 18; pg. 3, 14; and Attachment N . 3. This is contrary
to the undisputed evidence and the law. IDFG is entitled as a matter oflaw t statutory E}mployer
status.

E.

THE AWARD OF COSTS rs NOT wARRANTED.

i

Plaintiff seeks an award of costs pursuant to Rule lS(a). However,

clearly discussed

. ~ I

otion 1.or ~ummary

above, leave to amend the pleadings is not required. Furthermore, IDFG's

judgment on this issue is appropriate and, thus, there is no basis for any aw d of costl for this

motion.
ID. CONCLUSION

IDFG qualifies as a statutory employer of Leading Edge and its employe s. Pursu t to clear
and succinct Idaho law, it is entitled to immunity so long as the defense is aised priJ to trial.

I
I

.

Therefore, IDFG respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion di missing ~laintifr s

complaint

J
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April 25, 2016.
JOHNSON LAW GROUP

By:_ _ _ _ __.:,,,c_-+----+----'--

PETER J. JOHNSON
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICF.t
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of April, 2016, I caused to be s rved a coJy of

the

foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Charles H. Crupenter
Cru:penter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins Avenue, Suite 336
Missoula. MT 59802
Phone: (406) 543-0511
Fax:
(406) 258-0365

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile
[ ] Federal Express
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LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE LexisNexis® Hea
CORPORATION, Individually and as
Subrogee of Extreme Electric, Inc., Civil Procedure > .. . > Su mary
Judgment > Entitlem nt as M tter of
Plaintiff, V, UNITED STATES OF
Law > Genuine Dispu es
I ·.
AMERICA
and
. JOHN
DOE
Civil Procedure > ... > Sufi mary
CORPORATIONS 1-10, Defendants.
Judgment > Entitlem nt as M tter of
Law > Need for Trial
Case Summary
HNl One principa
purpole of
summary judgment i to isolafe an~
U.S. was not entitled to summary dispose of factual!
unsupported
judgment in a negligence and claims. It is not a disfavored
subrogation action filed by a workers' procedural shortcut, but is i~stead
compensation insurer that paid · the principal tool by hich factually
benefits to a worker who slipped and insufficient claims or efenses fan be
fell on an air force base. Idaho Code isolated and prevente from going to
Ann. § 72-223 statutory immunity trial with the attenda t unwartanted
did not apply to U.S. under facts of consumption of publ c and P,rivate
case, and Idaho premises liability law resources. The mer existeryce of
did not create strict liability for which some alleged factual d spute b~tween
the U.S. could not be found liable the parties will n t defeat ail
under the FfCA, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ otherwise properly su ported rhotion
1346(b), 2674. Further, it was not for
summary
ju gment; \ th~
clear from the record whether the requirement is that there fue no
independent contractor had a duty to genuine issue of mate ial
dear the roads and sidewalks of snow
Civil Procedure > Judgme111ts >
and ice as alleged by the U.S.
Summary Judgmen > Evidentiary
Considerations

· Overview

fact.l .
I

Outcome

·

United States' motion for summary HN2 The evidence, includi~g · all
judgment denied.
reasonable Inferences which IT1ay be
Brenda Winebarger
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2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291, *138291

drawn therefrom, must be viewed in
a light most favorable to the
non-moving party in a motion for
summary judgment, and the court
must not make credibility findings.
Direct testimony of the non-movant
must
be
believed,
however
implausible. On the other hand, the
court is not required to adopt
unreasonable
inferences
from
circumstantial evidence.
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Burdens of Proof> Movant
Persuasion & Proof
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Burdens of Proof >
Nonmovant Persuasion & Pr-oof

•

for summary judgme
party opposing sum
must direct the cou
specific triable facts.
brief, unsupported
cannot create an issu

1
t. Inste~d,
the

ary judgment
's atten~ion to
tateme~ts in a
y the record,
of fact.I
·

Workers' Compensa ion & S DI >
Coverage > Emplo ment St tus >
Employers

Workers' Compensa ion & S~DI >
Defenses > Exclusivi Provisions .
Business & Corporat Compli+nce >
... > Workers' Compe sation & ~SDI >
Exclusivity > Employ es & Em layers
Workers' Compensa ion & S1 DI >
Third Party Action > Third Party

f

Liability
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Opposing Materials > HN4 Generally, un er the Idaho
l\r,..,..m,-,~nuinn r'lnr1 ,m,=,.nt~tinn

HN3 Tht: rnuvi1 lt.1 ur.11 ly bears the
11 IILIQI UUI UCII VI ·t.n::!111v11 ... 1.n.n.111~
;..=-..:-_-_-;-~---:;..4:" ;-1 -·...T:,..:·l.'.:. .._:-: 4!..r
.r.
•
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party

need
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not

.........
., • .;

u..... any
... . .

introduce

CVl'-lwll ..... '-'

\. ....

affidavits or deposition excerpts) but
may simply point out the absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case. This shifts the burden to
the non-moving party to produce
evidence sufficient to support a jury
verdict in his favor. The non-moving
party must go beyond the pleadings
and show by his affidavits, or by the
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, or admissions on file
that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. However, the court is not
required to comb through the record
to find some reason to deny a motion
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parties, even if thee ployee is also
entitled to worker's compen~ation.
However, such thir -party liability
claims cannot be a serted ~gainst
I
.
so-called "statutory e ployeri," who
are either: (1) th se em, loyers
described in Idaho Code nn. ·§
72-216,
having
under \ them
contractors and subc ntractors who
have in fact com lied witlh tlie
provisions of Idaho Code 4nn. §
72-301 or (2) the ow er or lessee of
premises, or other erson ~ho :is
virtually the propriet r or opetiator of
the business there c rried on Idaho

1
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Code Ann. § 72-223. To identify a
statutory employer, the ·court first
considers the statutory definition of
"employer" found at Idaho Code Ann.
§ 72-102(13)(a). There, "employer"

is defined as any person who has
expressly or impliedly hired or
contracted the services of another.
This definition includes contractors
and subcontractors. An employer who
makes use of a contractor's or
subcontractor's employees qualifies
as a category one statutory employer
and is immune from suits in tort.

Torts > ... > Liability > Federal Tort
Claims Act> Elements

Workers' Compensation & SSDI >
Coverage > Employment Status >
Employers

Business & Corporate Compliance >
... > Workers' Compensation &SSDI >
Exclusivity > Employees & Employers

HNS The Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) provides a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity. That limited
waiver permits tort actions against
the federal government, but the
United States is liable only in· the.
same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like
circumstances under the law of the
place where the act or omission
occurred. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1346(b)r
.
·t .
. th c·
1rcu1 , in ana 1yzing
2674 • Th e N in
an action brought under California's
worker's compensations laws, held
that although the federal government
could never be exactly like a private
actor, a co~rt's job _in applying the
standard 1s to find the most

reasonable analogy, and most courts
have held that the United ,states
should be entitled to the same
immunity from suit enjoyed by a
private employer co ered b state
workmen's
compe sation
laws.
Accordingly, the U.S. District Court
for the District of I aho fin s that
statutory employer i munity under
Idaho's Worker's Co pensation Act
can apply to the Unite StatesrWhen
analyzing whether th United tates
is a statutory empl yer, the court
must focus on th
agency or
department of the United !states
which contracted for he workl
:

Torts > . .. > Liabili

I

·

> Federia1 ·rort

Claims Act > General Overview1
:
1
Torts > Public En ity Uab]"lity
Liability > Vicarious iability
·

>

Torts > Strict Liab lity >

· eneral

Overview

\

·

HN6 Under the Fede al Tort Paims
~ct, the United States cannot ~e held
lrable on any state law imposin; strict
liability. Additional!
the United
States may only be eld liabl~ if its
own employees acted egligently and
cannot be held liable u der the theory
of vicarious liability. 28 U.S.t.s. §
1
1346(b).
1

Tort~ > ... > Duty

n ~remjises >
Invitees > General o erv,ew I

HN7Under Idaho tort aw, empJoyees
and workmen, or thos who cdnfer a
tangible benefit to the landownbr, are
treated as invitees. A I ndowne~ owes
a ~ommon law duty of care jto an
Invitee to keep th
premises in

Brenda Winebarger

Ii
I

I
00047

16/25

LHW Ur r

PAGE

H.;t.~

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291, *138291

reasonably safe condition, or to warn Currently pending bef re the Court is
of hidden or concealed dangers.
However, this is not strict liability,
i.e., if an invit~e is injured if the
premises ~re in reasonably safe
condition, or if warned of hidden or
concealed dangers, the landowner is
not liable for such injuries.
Torts > .. , > Comparative Fault >
Multiple Parties > General Overview

Workers' Compensation & SSDI >
Third Party Actions > Third Party
Liability

HNB Under Idaho law, where both an
employer and third party are deemed
negligent, the employee's damages
are
apportioned
between
the
employer and third party.

counsel: [*1] For Liberty Northwest
Insurance Corporation, Individually
and as Subrogee of Extreme Electric,
Inc, Plaintiff: Mark D Sebastian,
Matthew Owen Pappas, ANDERSON
JULIAN and HULL LLP, Boise, ID.
For United States of America,
Defendant: Warren S Derbidge, LEAD
ATTORNEY, US AlTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Boise, ID.

Judges: Honorable Ronald E. Bush,
U. S. Magistrate Judge.
Opinion by: Ronald E. Bush

Opinion

Defendant United Stat s ofAm~rica's
Motion for Summary J dgmen~ (0kt.

I. BACKGROUND
on February 27, 200 , Sean trkins
("Perkins"}, an emplo ee of E treme
Electric, exited a work vehicle n Fox
Hunt Loop on the M untain !Home
(Idaho) Air Force Bas , slippe~ on a
I
patch of ice and fell, in urin·g hi back.
{Comp!., 111 11, 13, 0kt. 1.) The
vehicle was driven by a fellow
Extreme Electric e ployee, Ryan
Schaeffer. (Perkins D p., p. 3 , Dkt.
28-8.) Perkins later ad surgery on
his back in July 2009 (Comp\, at ,i
14.) Plaintiff Ube
Nortihwest
Insurance Corporati n ("Li~ertyu)
alleges that at the time qf the
accident, the road as comJl,letely
covered with ice and here appeared
to be no salt, s nd or other
maintenance to add re s the icf. (Id.
at, 13.)
i

I
I

As a result of [*2] his injury, Perkins
submitted a claim for w9rker's
compensation benefit with Liberty,
Extreme
Electric s
vyorker
compensation insurer, which paid out
benefits to Perkins in he amoG\ nt of
$74,436.32. (Id. at 1] 5.)
·
At the time of the ac ident, PJrsons
I
Evergreene . ("Parso s") was the
general contractor on a constr~ction
contract with the A my CoMps of
Engineers to constr ct 148 new

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND military
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I
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housing
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Mountain Home Air Force !Base.
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Jm

Parsons subcontracted with Extreme
Electric for the electrical work to be
done in those housing units in March
2007. (Derbridge Aff., Exs. A &. B,

dispute between the arties
not
defeat
an
othe ise
pr'pperly
supported motion for suTmary
judgment; the requi ement is that
Dkts. 28-4, 28-5.)
there be no genuine i sue of mlaterial
11
Lobb , Inc.,
In this negligence and subrogation fact. Anderson v. Lib
action, Liberty (as the subrogee of 477 U.S. 242, 247· 8, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1986 .
Extreme Electric and Perkins) alleges
that the United States of America HN2 The evidence, includi g all
("the Government") caused injury reasonable inference which 111ay be
which resulted in the payment of drawn therefrom, mu t be viewed in
worker
compensation
benefits. a light most favo able tb the
.
Liberty alleges that the United States, non-moving party and the Courj!I must
through the Department of Defense, not make credibility fi dings. i'~e id.
the Department of the Air Force, and at 255. Direct 'test mony of the
Mountain Home Air Force Base, non-movant must be be~ieved,
owned and operated property in however implausible. eslie V, !Grupo
Elmore County, specifically Fox Hunt IC~, 1_98 F.3d 1152, 1159
C(r.
Loop, and was responsible for the 1999). On the other and, th~ Court
of the property, is not required to ado unreas,mabl:e
maintenance
including removal of snow and ice.
inferences
from
circums~antial
evidence. McLaughlin . Liu, 849 F.2d
II. DISCUSSION
1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 988).
I

.

C:fh

A-

The

Summary

Judgment HN3 The (*4] movi g party bears
Standard
the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a ge uine is~ue of
HN:l. One (*3] principal purpose of
summary judgment "is to isolate and material fact. Deven ux v. A:bbey,
263 F.3d 1070, 1076 9th Cir. · 001).
dispose of factually unsupported
To carry this burden, t e movin , party
claims .... " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
need not introduce ny affirijnative
477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct.
evidence (such as affidav,t~ or
2548, 91 L. Ed. ?d 265 (1986). It is deposition excerpts) ut may simply
"not a
disfavored
procedural
point out the absence of evid~nce to
shortcut," but is instead the "principal
support the nonmovi g party's case.
tool [ ] by which factually insufficient
Fairbank
v.
Wun erman \ Cato
claims or defenses [can] be isolated
Johnson, 212 F.3d 52 , 532 (9.lth Cir.
and prevented from going to trial
2000).
with the attendant unwarranted
consumption of public and private This shifts the b rden t~ the
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere non-moving party to prtoduce
existence of some alleged factual evidence sufficient to support a jury
Brenda Winebarger
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verdict in his favor. See id. at 256-57.
The non-moving party must go
beyond the pleadings and show "by
[his] affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or
admissions on file" that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324.

by third parties, even f the em loyee
is
also
entitled
to
worker's
compensation.
Ho ever, I such
third-party liability cl ims canpot be
asserted against so-c lied "sta;tutory
employers," who a
eitheJ: (l)
"those employers des ribed in ection

comb through the record to find some
reason to deny a motion for summary
judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,
· 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel.
Co,, 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir.
1988)). Instead, the "party opposing
summary judgment must direct [the
Court's] attention to specific triable
[*S] facts." Southern California Gas
Co.· v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d
885,889 (9th Cir. 2003). Statements
in a brief, unsupported by the record,
cannot create an issue of fact. Barnes
v. Independent Auto. Dealers, 64 F.3d
1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995).

who have in fact co plied wi h the
provisions of section 72-301, Idaho
Code" or (2) "the ow er or le see of
premises, or other erson ·ho is
virtually the proprieto or oper tor of
the business there car ied on . [*6] .

72-216, Idaho Code, having under
However, the Court is "not required to them contractors and subcont actors

B. Statutory Employer Immunity
Under I.e. § 72•223 Does Not
Apply to the United States on
these Facts.
HN4 GeneraUy, under the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Act's (the
"Act") exclusive remedy rule, an
injured employee is limited to
recovery in worker's compensation
and cannot sue in tort. Fuhriman v.
State, 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480,

484 (Idaho 2007). An exception to
that rule allows an injured employee
to seek damages for injuries caused

. " I.C. § 72-223.
To identify a statutor employ~r, the
court first considers the st~tutory

lat

definition of 11 employe "found
I.C.
§ 72-102(13)(a). Fuh iman, lj3 P.3d
at· 484 (internal cita ions on,itted).
There 1 "employer" is efined a!s "any
person who has expre sly or im'pliedly
hired or contracted he servi~es of
another." I.C. § 72-1 2(13)(a~. This
definition includes c ntractoris and
subcontractors. Kol r v. r:assia
County, 142 Idaho 46, 12V P.3d
962, 968 (Idaho 200 ). An en,ployer
who makes use of a contractbr's or
subcontractor's empl yees. q~alifies
as a category one sta tory
and is immune fro
suits
tort;
Venters v. Sorrento el., Ina.,
141
I
Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 92, 396 :(Idaho
200s).
The Government argu s for statutory
I
employer immunity n these! facts.
First, the Government contractfd with
Parsons, who acted s the general
contractor on the ilitary hiousing

Brenda Win~barger
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project,
and
Parsons
then qualify for statut ry employer
subcontracted with Extreme Electric. immunity. Liberty initi ted this ection
Second, both. the general contract pursuant to HNS th Feder~I Tort
and subcontract required worker's Claims Act (FTCA), w ich provides a
~ornpens~tion ins.urance be provided limited waiver of sover ign imniunity.
m compliance w,th I.C. § 72~301. That limited [*8] wai er permits tort
Accordingly,
the
Government · actions · against
the
f~deral
contends that it "expressly or government, but the nited St~tes is
impliedly hired and/or contracted the liable only in the same manner bnd to
se~yices of another" and ~herefore is ~he. . same exte~t
s a 8rivate
a category [*7] one statutory 1nd1v1dual under like circumstances
employer, immune from third-party under the law of "the lace whJre the
liability.
act or omission occur ed.'' 28 µ.s.c.
Liberty argues that the Government §§ 1346(b), 2674. Th Ninth ~prcuit,
is not subject to the Idaho's Worker's in ~naly~ing an action broughtj under
Compensation Act because the Cahforn1a's worker's ompen~ations
Government does not fit within the laws, held that altho gh the ~ederal
Act's definition of ''person," cannot government could n er be exactly
be· an "employer" under the Act and like a private actor, " court'J.s·ob in
therefore
cannot
quality
for applying the .standar is to fi d the
third-party immunity. See I.C. most reasonable anal gy ... [and]
72-102(24) (defining person as "the most courts have hel . , . t at the
state or any political subdivision United States should be entitled to
thereof, any individual, partnership, the same immunity fr m suit epjoyed
firm, association, trust, corporation . by a private emplo r coveriled by11
•. "). Liberty also argues that because state workmen's com ensation laws.
the Government is not required to LaBarge v. County o Mariposa, 798
provide
worker's
compensation F.2d 364, 367 (9th ir. 1986j). See
coverage under the Act and would also Rivera v. U.S. rmy Cqrps of
not be liable for compensation if Eng'rs, 891 F.2d 56 568 ($th Cir.
Extreme Electric had not complied 1990) (finding stat tory eniployer
with the requirements to obtain rule applies to the Uni ed State~ when
worker's compensation coverage 1 it it is sued under the FTCA).
1
is not entitled to immunity. Lastly, Accordingly, the Co rt findr that
liberty contends that the Government statutory employer i munity under
cannot 11 boot$trap" into statutory Idaho's Worker's Co pensatipn Act
employer status.
~an apply to the Unit d Statej'

The Court will first address Liberty's The next issue is wh ther statutory
argument
that
because
the employer immunity rovided/ for in
Government Is not subject to Idaho's I.C. § 72-223 does in [*9] fac,t app.ly
Worker's Compensation Act1 it cannot to the United State In thi~ case.
Brenda Winebarger
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When analyzing whether the United
States is a statutory employer, the
Court must focus on the agency or
department of the United States
which contracted for the work. See

Struhs ·v. Protection Technologies,
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164,
169 (Idaho 1999) (quoting Izard v.
United States, 946 F.2d 1492, 1495
(10th Cir. 1991)). See also Rivera v.
U.S. Army Corps of £ng'rs, 891 F.2d
567, 568 (5th Cir. 1990); Pendley v.
United States, 856 F.2d 699, 702 (4th
Cir. 1988).

The Idaho Supreme

I

.

urt fou~d that

the DOE, "which indi ctly employed
Struhs through its ontracts with
EG&G and the subco tract wit~ APS,
was Struhs' statutory employer. 11 Id.
at 169. On the other and, th~ court
found that "the Arm which ~ad no
contractual
or
emplo~ment
relationship with St uhs, Wqs not
Struhs' statutory emp oyer .. j_[and]
[a]s with any third- arty tortfeasor
where the empl yer isl not
concurrently negligen , the Arrhy was
fully liable for any da ages sOffered
by Struhs ... " Id.
\
.

The Struhs case is particularly
alleg~s that
instructive to the issue before the In the Complaint, Lib
the
Department of Defens~, the
Court. In Struhs, the United States
Department of the ir Force, and
Department
of
Energy (DOE)
Mountain Home Air orce Ba~e are
contracted with EG&G Idaho, Inc.
responsible for Perkin I injuri~s. The
("EG&G") to operate certain Idaho record before the Cou t shows lthat it
National Engineering Laboratory was the Army Corps of Engi1neers,
(INEL) facilities. 1 EG&G in turn through a general ontractdr and
contracted with American Protective subcontractors, that contractkd fcir
Services (APS) to provide security the work and indire tly ernbloyed
services at INEL. Plaintiff Struhs Perkins. (Derbridge A ., Exs. ~' 8.) 2
worked for APS and while in the
course of his employment, he was The [*11] Govern ent co~tends
driving a vehicle which was struck that, through these ontract?rs, it
and injured by a negligently operated was the statutory em p oyer of Aerkins
U.S. Army vehicle. 992 P.2d at and immune from thir -party li~bi.lity
165-66. Notably, the contract under I.C. § 72-223. n making this
between the DOE and EG&G was an argument, the G vemme~t fs
"allowable cost and fee contract," contending that it sh uld be trieated
under which DOE paid actual costs as one monolithic e tity. Hor,evei",
for EG&G expenses, including pursuant to Struhs, t e Court 1is not
nited States
[*10] payments for worker's to look at the
as
a
wh
le
but iMstead
Government
compensation premiums. Id.
1

The "INEL" is now known as the Idaho National Laboratory, or "INL. 11

~ The excerpted portions of the relevant contracts that have been placed In the record a
the contracts are similar to the rtallowable cost and fee contracts" Involved in Strohs.
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must examine the individual federal
agencies involved in the matter. The
Government attempts to bring the
Department of Defense, the Air Force
and Mountain Home Air Force Base
into the contracts between the Corps,
Parsons and Extreme Electric.
However, there is no evidence before
the Court that connects these entities
to the general contractor and the
subcontractor. Rather, it appears that
if there is a government entity entitled
to claim statutory employer status, it
Id b
h
wou
e t e Army Corps of
Engineers, not one or more of the
Department of Defense entities.
At the hearing on. this motion, the
parties spent considerable time
addressing the case of Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d
9.51 (tdaho 2003). In that case, the
supermarket company Fred Meyer
contracted with a general contractor,
Bateman-Hall, to construct a building
on [* 12] a site owned by Fred Meyer.
Id., at 952. Bateman-Hall then
contracted with Robison Roofing to
perform the roofing work on the
project. An employee of Robison
Roofing was injured in the course of
his work, and brought a third-party
claim against Fred Meyer. Id. at
952-53. The Idaho Supreme Court
held that Fred Meyer was not a
statutory empjoyer under category
two of the statute, which exempts
from liability "the owner or lessee of

premises, or other person who is
virtually the proprietor or operator of
the business there carried on, but
who, by reason of there being an

I

fJr

independent contrac or or
any
other reason, is n t the direct
J

employer of the w rkmen lthere
employed." The si nificant fact,

according to the I aho Su reme
Court, was that Fred eyer ''\~as not
in the business of con truction or roof
installation."
Id.
at
212-13
( discussing that to e a st~tutory
employer, the work b ing carried out
by the independent c ntractor pn the
owner or proprietor's premisel must
have been the type t at could have
been carried out by th emplo)tees of
the owner or propriet r in the tourse
of its usual trade
(internal quotations o
other hand, the court
[*13] that Bateman~
contractor, was i
third-party· tort Ii
category one of the s

or bu~iness)
itted). On th:e
ent on to find
all, the g1 neral
mune from
bility under
tute.

Arguably, Fred Meyer n Robison was
in much the same osition ~s
the.
I
DOE in Struhs. B th indjrectly
employed the injured erson tHrough
general and subcontr cts. Ho~ever,

in Struhs the court hel that th:e DOE
was a statutory emplo er; in Rqbison,
the same court held t at Fred JMeyer
was not a statut ry em~loyer.
Notably, Fred Mey r's sta~utory
employer status was only analyzed
I
under category two f the statute.
The Court has
eviewedl the
underlying briefs filed with the\Idaho
Supreme Court in th Robisom case
and concludes from t at review that
the issue of whether red Mey~r was
immune from third party li 1abllity
under category one w s never fiaised.
In this case, the Gov rnmentl made
i
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clear at the hearing that it was not
seeking statutory employer status
under category two. Accordingly, the
holding in Robison is inapposite to
the facts before the Court. Put simply,
the Idaho Supreme Court did not
consider the same issue in Robison as
is before this Court in the instant
case. Instead, as discussed above,
this case is analogous to Struhs and
i I'
Ith th t
th ·ty [*l 4 ] th
n ine w
a au on '
e
Court finds that the Government is
not a category one statutory
employer. 3

1·

argues that Parsons the g neral
contractor acting inde endentlY, was
[* 15] the only pos ibly netjligent
actor and the Govern ent
be
held liable for its acts.

cantot

HN6 Under the FTCA, the United
States cannot be held liable on any
state law imposing strtct liability. See
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 804, 92
S. Ct. 1899, 32 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1972).
Additionally, the United States may
only be held liable if its own
employees acted negligently and
cannot be held liable under the theory
of vicarious liability. See Logue v.
United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33,
93 S. Ct. 2215, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121
(1973); 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b).

It is correct that unde the FTC , the
United States cannot be held Iliable
under a strict liabili
theor'rl, See
Lairdv. Nelms, 406 U. · 797, 718-99,
92 S. Ct. 1899, 32 . Ed. 2tl 499
{1972). However., HN under Idaho
tort law, employees an workmen, or
those who confer a tan ible benefit to
,
the landowner, are treatetl as
invitees. See Keller v. Holiday\ Inns,
Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 71 P.2d 11112,
1116 (Idaho Ct. A p, 1983). A
landowner owes a co rnon lav!J duty
of care to an invite to kee the
premises
In
reas nably
safe
condition, or to warn of hidden or
concealed dangers. olzhei er v.
Johannesen, 125 ldah 397, 8711 P.2d
814,817 (Idaho 1994). Howev~r, this
is not strict liability, i. . , if an invitee
is injured if the pr mises ,. re in
reasonably · safe co dition, or. .jf
warned of hidden or con¢ealed
dangers, the landown r is not\ liable
for such injuries. A ordingly, the
claims against the G vernrnent are
not barred on those g ounds. \

The Government contends that
Idaho's premises liability law creates
strict liability and therefore the
Government cannot be found liable
for such claims. The Government also

The Government
lso cofirectly
asserts that it cannot e liable fior the
negligent acts of th Independent
contractor, Parsons. See (Jlnited
States v. Orleans, 25 u.s.l 807,

c.

Idaho Premises Liability Law
Does Not Preclude Plaintiff's
Claim against the United States
on the Present Record.

I

Importantly, the dlstlnctlon here pertains to the negligence Plaintiff has alleged galnst the ~articular
Department of Defense entities. If the negligence claim was made against the Army C s of Engineers,
the
1
result would be different. And, equally Importantly, this decision does not presume tha such negligfnee has
been proved - that burden remains to be met by Pliillntlff,
,

3
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813-14, 96 S. Ct. 1971, 48 L. Ed. 2d
390 (1976). This is one of the
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign
[*16] immunity. Id. See Logue v.
United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33,
93 S. Ct. 2215, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121
{1973); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
However, although there is no dispute
that Parsons was an independent
contractor, it is not clear from the
record whether Parsons had a duty to
clear the roads and sidewalks of snow
and ice as alleged by the Government.
The only evidence in support of this
contention is the deposition of
Brannon Brown, an Extreme Electric
employee, who, when asked who was
responsible for the Ice removal on the
road or work site, responded: "I think
it was the contractor, the general
contractor, Parsons." (Brown Dep., at
p. 40, Dkt. 28-7.) While probative,
Mr. Brown's statement is not
dispositive for showing that it was the
negligent act of an independent
contractor that caused Mr. Perkins'
fall and subsequent injury. The
inferences that can reasonably be
drawn from other evidence in the
record, which must be construed
against the Government, create an
issue of fact upon this question,
particularly where nothing has been
submitted that would establish that
such a duty had been transferred
under common law or by contract
during the construction process from
the landowner, where it would
ordinarily lie, to the [*17] general
contractor.
Accordingly,
the
Government will not be granted
summary judgment on this defense,

although additional
might very well su
defense.

I

aJ

trial
slllch a
I

1

1

D. Whether the E ployer1 was
Negligent is a Ques ion of ~act. .
The Government ap ars to jargue
that whatever negllge ce therejmight
be is attributable on y to E1treme
Electric, and thus is a bar \o the
Government being held ~iable,
entitling the Governm nt to surpmary
judgment. The Gover ment co~tends
that Extreme Electric was negligent
because Perkins'
upervis9r at
Extreme Electric, who was the_jdriver
of the van, parked th van facirg the
wrong way on the str et so tHat the
passengers had to exit into the tTiiddle
of the street, rather t an onto ja curb
or sidewalk. (See Per ins Dep.\at 23,
Dkt. 28-8.)
i
,
HNB_Under Idaho law where ~oth an
employer and third pa y are d~emed
negligent, the emplo ee's
ages
are
apportioned
etween
the
employer and thir
party, See
Runcorn v. Shearer umber rods.,

dar'

f

107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324!, 331
(Idaho 1984). It ap ears to be an
open question und r Idahp law
whether a third-par may b~ liable
for less than its o n negligence
percentage share of he dam~ges if
the amount of worker' comperysation
benefits [*18] paid out is greater
than .the amount t e employer's
assessed negligence ight yielld as a
percentage of any to al dama$es (in
an employee's law uit against a

I
I
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third-party).

4

Regardless, on the of America's Motion for Su Imary

present record the issue of Extreme
Electric's
alleged
negligence
compared to the Government's
alleged negligence, and any resulting
implications as to the Government's
potential liability, are questions of fact
that preclude summary judgment on
this particular defense.

Judgment (Dkt. 28) is DENIED.
DATED: November 3 , 2011

/s/ Ronald E. Bush
Honorable Ronald E.
U. S. Magistrate Judg

III.
ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendant [*19] United States

4

I

Runcorn stands for the proposition that an Injured employee should not obtain a dou le recoveryJ through

a third-party tort action, which led to the holding in that case concerning the offset (in th amount of;worl<er's
compensation payments made to the employee) to which a third-party defendant might b
of a damage award agalnst that defendant. Notably, however, Runcorn Involved joint and
than the comparative negligence doctrine that exists today, which leaves unanswered ho
applled by the court in Runcorn would be l.ltilized in a case involving a special verdict a
negligence among multiple tortfeasors.
·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

PERRY KRINIIT,et.a/.
Plaintiffs,

)

CASE NO. CV12-146

)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MEMORANDUM ORDER

y
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

___________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)

State of Idaho Department of Fish and Game (Department) has filed a
motion for summary judgment, based on their assertion that the Department is a
statutory employer in accordance with Idaho worker's compensation law and
therefore immune from damages from claims resulting from Plaintiff Krinitt's
(Krinitt) allegation of Department's negligence.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Krinitt's son, also named Perry Krinitt, (hereinafter referred to as Perry)
was an employee of Leading Edge Aviation. Leading Edge Aviation provided
aviation services to various government agencies, including the Idaho
Department of Fish and Garnet Perry was killed when the helicopter he was
piloting crashed. The helicopter was en route to the Selway River, where the two
passengers were to conduct a fish survey for the Department.
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Expert witnesses attributed the cause of the crash to a clip board that hit
the tail rotor. Evidence shows that one of the passengers became sick and
opened the helicopter door, dropping her clip board in the process.
Krinitt filed a wrongful death suit, contending the accident was caused by
the negligence of the Department. The Department filed a summary judgment
motion, addressing the negligence claim. The District Court granted the motion,
finding that Krinitt failed to prove that the Department's negligence caused the
accident. Krinitt appealed that decision to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court found that the circumstantial evidence provided
evidence to establish negligence and proximate cause. Krinitt v. Idaho Dept.

Fish and Game, 159 Idaho 125, _ _, 357 P.3d 850,854 (2015). The Court
determined a jury could conclude that the accident would not have happened if
the passenger had kept control of the clipboard. Id., 357 P.3d at 855. The case
was remanded back to District Court.
Department then filed a summary judgment motion on the basis of
statutory·immunity.
LAW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." /.R.C.P. 56(c). Department has presented no issues of fact
in their motion for summary judgment, but present questions of law relating to the
status of the Department as a statutory employer, shielded from tort liability. See
Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho 162, 164, 742 P.2d 417,419 (1987).

Idaho's worker's compensation law removes, with a few exceptions, all
workplace injuries from 'private controversy.' Kolar v. Cassia County 142 Idaho
346,351,127 P.3d 962,967 (2005), quoting I.C.§ 72-210. Under what is called
the exclusive remedy rule, an injured employee is limited to his worker's
compensation recovery, and can not sue in tort. Fuhriman v. State Dept. of
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Trans. 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007). Fuhriman explains the
exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule:
... I.C. § 72-223 provides an exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Even
if an injured employee is entitled to compensation under the Worker's
Compensation Law, a third party may still have legal liability to the injured
person. I.C. § 72-223(1). The statute specifically excludes certain
employers from third party liability. First, the statute excludes from third
party liability "those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code,
having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact
complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code [requiring
employers to secure payment of compensation] .... " Id....
In determining whether a party is immune to an I.C. § 72-223 third party
liability suit, we 'look to the previously established statutory definition of
'employer' found in [I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) ], as interpreted by this Court.'
Venters v. Sorrento Delaware. Inc., 141 Idaho 245. 249, 108 P.3d 392,
396 (2005). That definition has two categories 1 • Under the first category, a
statutory employer 'means any person who has expressly or impliedly
hired or contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and
subcontractors. I.C. § 72-102(13)(a}. In order to qualify as a category one
statutory employer, the employer by contracting or subcontracting out
services, must be liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct
employer does not.
The Court has summarized the I.C.§ 72-223 category one protection for
employers as including 'employers who make use of a contractor's or
subcontractor's employees.'

Id., footnote added
DISCUSSION
Department summarizes their argument as follows:
Krinitt was employed by Leading Edge as a pilot. By virtue of IDFG's
contractual relationship with Krinitt's employer, Leading Edge, Krinitt was
· a statutory employee of IDFG. As a statutory employee of IDFG, any
recovery by Krinitt is limited by Idaho's worker's compensation law, which
precludes any suit in tort by him or others claiming through him. Thus,
IDFG as Krinitt's statutory employer is entitled to tort immunity pursuant to
1.C. § 72-223.

Department's memorandum in support of summary judgment, p. 5.

1

The second example is not relevant under our considered facts.
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Krinitt argues that Department was not his son's statutory employer, and
even if he was, the Department has waived this argument.
1. Department as Perry's statutory employer. Krinitt argues that the
requisite privily does not exist between Department and Leading Edge aviation,
Perry's employer. The Department of Interior (DOI), Krinitt argues, was the entity
that contracted with Leading Edge, not Department. The DOI had no obligation
to provide worker's compensation coverage under Idaho law, federal law, or any
contract between DOI and Department.
To support their argument that Department was a statutory employer of
Perry Krinitt, the Department provides copies of the Service Level Agreement
between the Department of Interior and the Department, and a contract produced
during discovery by Leading Edge Aviation. Department argues that these
documents show that Department contracted with Leading Edge for aviation
services.
The Service Level Agreement states that the Department and DOI entered
into the agreement to establish aviation services "specifically for and behalf of the
State of Idaho-Idaho Fish and Game." Aft. of P. Johnson, attachment 2, p. 2. In
essence, the Department contracted with DOI to manage and insure the quality
of their needed aviation services.
In turn, in order for Leading Edge to contract to provide aviation services
for Department, they had to comply with the requirements outlined in Attachment
3 to Johnson's affidavit.
Although Krinitt does not supply any signatory pages to any of these
documents, it is evident from consideration of the documents as a whole that
Department is a party to the contract with Leading Edge. As an example, the
Service Level Agreement lists Department duties on pages 3 and 4, including the
assignment of Department responsibility for the adjudication of any tort claims
that arise from the use of contracted aircraft.
The Leading Edge contract (attachment 3, Aff. of P. Johnson) identifies
State of Idaho Fish and Game Dept. as a user of the contract. Aft. of P.
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Johnson, attachment 3, Bates# 1451. It does not, however, refer to any

particular duties of Department. Krinitt points out that contract disputes under
the Leading Edge contract are subject to the federal law. Aff. of P. Johnson,
attachment 3, Bates # 1468. However, this is not a contract dispute, but is a tort

dispute. The Service Level Agreement assigns response to tort suits to the
Department.
The definition of employer under Idaho Worker's Compensation law
includes "any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the
services of another." J.C.§ 72-102(13)(a). From the evidence presented, the
Court concludes that Department, if not expressly, impliedly hired the services of
Leading Edge Aviation.
Further, Krinitt has not rebutted by affidavit or other permissible means
that the contracts presented by Department do not show that Leading Edge was
a contractor of Department. See I.R.C.P. 56 (e). Krinitt can not rely only on his
statements that there was not a contractual relationship. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Having determined that Leading Edge was a contractor of Department, the
next step is to determine if Department is an exempt, statutory employer. Idaho
case law and worker's compensation law indicates that it is. First, Department
used a contractor, Leading Edge, who did provide worker's compensation
insurance for Perry Krinitt. /.C. § 72-223, Aft. of P. Johnson, attachment 5.
In a similar case, Fuhriman v. State, Dept. of Transportation, supra, the
State.contracted the services of Multiple Concrete Enterprises for a construction
project. Several employees of Multiple Concrete Enterprises were killed at the
construction site. Survivors filed a suit against the State DOT, alleging
negligence in their design of safety zones. ~he Supreme Court found that the
State was category one statutory ~mployer of the contractor's employees and
thus was protected from tort suit by the exclusive remedy rule. Id., 143 Idaho at
805, 153 P.3d at 485. Similarly, the Department contracted through DOI for the
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aviation services from Leading Edge. The Department was a category one
statutory employer of Krinitt.
Krinitt also alleges that DOI involvement in the contracting of Leading
Edge removes consideration of Idaho worker's compensation law because of the
Supremacy clause and because the federal government is not subject to Idaho
worker's compensation law. In Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v United States 2011
WL 6002468, the Idaho District Court found that statutory immunity under the
Idaho Worker's Compensation scheme can apply to the United States and
federal government involvement does not remove Idaho Worker's Compensation
law from consideration.
2. Waiver of Department's statutory immunity claim. Krinitt also avers
that the Department has waived the affirmative defense of statutory immunity that
it is now claiming. Krinitt correctly states that Department failed to raise the
defense before, despite many opportunities, including in its tort claim, its answer
to the complaint, an amendment to the complaint, its previous summary
judgment motion, and its appeal before the Supreme Court. Court imposed
deadlines for declaring this affirmative defense have long past.
All parties agree that statutory immunity is an affirmative defense. See
Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 803, 153 P.3d at 483. Fuhriman also states that an

affirmative defense can be raised for the first time on a motion for summary
judgment when the defense is raised before trial and the opposing party had time
to argue in opposition. Id. 143 Idaho at 804, 153 P.3d at 484. Krinitt has argued
in opposition to the affirmative defense, and, although the matter has been up to
the Supreme Court and back, no trial has been held. The Court finds that under
Fuhriman, there has been no waiver of the affirmative defense.

However, as Krinitt points out, on~ of the purposes of the workers
compensation schemes is to create "sure and certain" relief for on-the-job injuries
and fatalities, without having to litigate fault. /. C.§ 72-201. Krinitt has been
litigating fault for four years. In that four years, through depositions, a prior
summary judgment motion, an appeal to the Supreme Court and a remand back
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to District Court, and mediation, the issue of statutory immunity was not raised
until March 21, 2016, when the summary judgment motion now under
consideration was filed. Krinitt has not had sure and certain relief for the loss of
his son. Nor has this been a speedy and inexpensive litigation. See J.R.C.P.
1(a).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a) also provides for the speedy, fair, and
efficient disposition of a case by requiring the Court to prepare a scheduling
order. Such order was entered by this Court on February 14, 2013. The order
imposed the deadline of February 15, 2013 for any amendment of pleadings.
Any dispositive motions were to be filed by January 31, 2014. Defendant's first
motion for summary judgment was filed on that date.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i) allows the Court to impose sanctions if
a party fails to follow a scheduling order. The use of sanctions for violating a
scheduling order is within the discretion of the Court. Peterson v. Mccawley 135
Idaho 282, 284, 16 P.3d 958,960 (Ct. App. 2000).

In fashioning sanctions, a

trial court should 'balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the ·
disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.' Id., citation
omitted.

Certainly, the Department should have known and discovered their
affirmative defense of statutory immunity long before this time. Department took
a risk in retaining an out-of-state attorney, who though licensed in Idaho,
admitted at oral argument that he was not familiar with Idaho worker's
compensation law. This is an area of law that has been substantially litigated in
Idaho venues and has been the subject of numerous appellate decisions.
However, it is also clear that the action of the Department in belatedly filing their
second motion for summary judgment was not based on intentional misconduct.
The Department's counsel was unaware of the relevant issue concerning
immunity based upon worker's compensation and Krinitt's counsel conceded that
the oversight was based on negligence, not intentional conduct. Krinitt is an

Memorandum Order-7

OOOb3

innocent party that incurred a great amount of litigation expense and time
needlessly pursuing a negligent claim.
I.R.C.P. 16(i) provides that the Court may make such orders that are just
in determining an appropriate sanction for violation of a court scheduling order.
The Court may order the most drastic sanction by denying a dispositive motion
on the basis that it was untimely filed. Krinitt argues this is the appropriate
remedy but did not support the argument under I.R.C.P. 16(i). Such a drastic
sanction must not be considered until the Court weighs lesser sanctions and
finds that less severe sanctions would be inadequate. Peterson, 135 Idaho at

284, 16 P.3d at 960.
The Court believes that when the factors required to be considered by

Peterson are weighed that the just outcome would be a lesser sanction than
dismissal of the dispositive motion filed by the Department. The oversight
caused by the Department was unintentional. The oversight was not part of a
pattern of delay or gamesmanship by the Department. The oversight was
immediately brought before the Court with the Department acknowledging its
error. Despite the factors indicating that the Department's actions were not
egregious, there is no argument that Krinitt was prejudiced by such action.
The Court finds that the Department's delay in filing its dispositive motion
was not substantially justified and that there are no circumstances which would
make the awarding of fees and expenses to Krinitt unjust.
Department's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Court orders
that the Department, not the Department's attorney, be ordered to pay Krinitt's
reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred by the Department's failure to
comply with the Court's scheduling order which required filing of dispositive
motions no later than January 31, 2014. Krinitt shall file a memorandum of costs
and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P 54. The Court will consider all the
expenses and fees incurred by Krinitt after January 31, 2014.
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DATEDthis

j

~
dayofJune,2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersi~n~~eputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby
certify that on this

4

day of June,. 2016, served a true and correct copy of

the Memorandum Order by mail or fax to:

Peter J. Johnson
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane,V'JA 99207-2317

Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802

l\

J

Mail

C

- - -Fax
--t-Mail

- - -Fax
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 01so/' +-l--1.;C,-/--->.,~~~-l,f--;,,,,,..STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

PERRY KRINITT,eta/.
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-146
·JUDGMENT

)
VS.

)

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

)

__________
Defendants.

)
)

))

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

Judgment is entered in favor of the State of Idaho Department of Fish and
Game .on their Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice

Plaintiff's claim against them ..
Attorney fees and costs are awarded to Plaintiff from January 31, 2014.
DATED this~day of June; 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersi.gnf Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby
certify that on this

l9

· day of June, 2016, served a true and correct copy of

the Memorandum Order by mail or fax to:

Peter J. Johnson
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane,VVA 99207-2317

Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
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Mail
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Mail
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Charles H. Carpenter
Idaho Bar No. 8322
Carpenter Law Firm pk
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 543-0511
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LEWIS COUN1Y

PERRY KRINIIT

)

No. CV 12-146

)
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)

)

_________
Defendants-Appellees.

)
)

TO: IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME et al, AND PETER J.
JOHNSON,JOHNSON LAW GROUP, 103 E. Indiana, Suite A, Spokane, WA
99207-2317, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Perry Krinitt, appeals against the above-named
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment in favor of
respondents entered in the above-entitled action on the 1st day of June, 2016,
Honorable Judge Fitzmaurice presiding.

· . 000ti9

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
to Rule 11(a)(1) I.A.R. Appellant notes that the judgment does contain a reference to
the district court's grant of summary judgment; this may well not affect the running of
the time for appeal. Appellant also notes that appellees have filed a limited motion
for reconsideration in the district court, which motion has not yet been ruled on.
Because of the nature of the motion reconsideration, Appellant has concluded that
this motion also may not have affected the time for him to appeal.
3. Appellant currently intends to raise the following issues on appeal:
(a) Whether the district court properly applied the standards for granting
summary judgment;

(b) Whetl1er the district court's factual findings in ruling of the motion for
summary judgment are supported by the evidence; and
(c) Whether the district court's legal conclusions in ruling on the motion for
summary judgment are correct as a matter of law.
(d) Whether the district erred in finding that appellees had not waived the
defense of statuto1y employer immunity.
(e) Whether the district court should have sanctioned appellees by denial of
their motion for summary judgment.

(f) Alternatively, whether the sanction awarded to Appellant should have gone
back to the inception of the claim, rather than to January 31, 2014.
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.
5. Appellant requests preparation of a reporter's transcript of the May 2, 2016
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R:
(a) Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed March 17, 2016 (including
all attachments thereto).
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(b) Plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary judgment, filed April 13,
2016 (including all attachments thereto);
(c) Defendants' reply brief in support of summary judgment, filed April 25,
2016 (including all attachments thereto); and
(d) The district court's findings and conclusions entered on June 1, 2016.

7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice has been served on the court reporter.

(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20. See Certificate of Service appended hereto.
DATED THIS 8th day of July, 2016.

Respectfully s u b ~
/

?--" __.--·

: Carp,enter
CARPENT
W FIRM, plc
210 N. Higgins Ave., Ste. 336
l\1issoula, MT 59802
Telephone :(406) 543-0511
Facsimile: (406) 258-0365
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com
.Attorney far Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV1CE

Pursuant to I.A.R. 17 (1), I hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of
Appeal has, this 8th day of June, 2016, been mailed to:
Keith Evans
K. & K Reporting
P.O. Box 574
Lewiston, ID 83501

Peter Johnson
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
Lawrence Wasden
700 W Jefferson St# 210
Boise, ID 83720-0101
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
PERRY KRINITI,

Supreme Court No. _ _ __

Plaintiff/Appellant

vs.

Case No: CV-2012-0000146

STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, and

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

STATE OF IDAHO.
Defendant/Respondent

Appeal from: SECOND Judicial District, LEWIS County. Honorable GREGORY FITZMAURICE
presiding.
Case number from court or agency: CV2012-146
Order or judgment appealed from: FINALJUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
Attorney for Appellant: CHARLES H. CARPENTER
Attorney for Respondent: PETER J JOHNSON
Appealed by: PERRY KRINITI
Appealed against: IDAHO FISH AND GAME and STATE OF IDAHO
Notice of Appeal filed: July 11, 2016
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA
Amended Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA
Appellate fee paid: $529.00 on July 11. 2016
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record filed: NA
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional reporter's transcript filed: NA
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? YES
Estimated number of pages: UNKOWN AT THIS TIME
If so, name of each reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
Name and address:

KEITH EVANS

K&K REPORTING
PO BOX 574
LEWISTON ID 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
Perry Krinitt,
Plaintiff/Appellant
CASE NO. CV-2012-146
Supreme Court No. 44326-2016

vs.
Certificate of Exhibits
State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Respondent.
STATE OF IDAHO)
County of Lewis)
I,

Alesia Winner,

Clerk of the District Court of the

Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
County of Lewis,

in and for the

hereby certify that the following are all the

exhibits to-wit:
NONE

Dated this

Alesia Winner,
/\
By:

n1i

\

r\

!\ U

i.

' \J '-,

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
)

Perry Krinitt,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

) LEWIS COUNTY NO.CV-12-146
}
)

vs.

)

Supreme Court
Docket NO. 44326-2016

)

State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS

)
}
)

NOTICE OF LODGING
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
AND CLERK'S RECORD

)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT on the
~'1

/1

day of

VI. Af, 2016, the Clerk's record in the above referenced

~ s lodged with the District Court Clerk.
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the
date of service of the appeal record to file any
objections, together with a Notice of Hearing, with the
District Court.

If no objection is filed, the record will

Clerk of the Court
Cc:
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

NOTICE OF LODGING
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE. SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
Perry Krinitt,
Plaintiff/Appellant
LEWIS COUNTY NO. CV2012-146
SUPREME COURT NO. 44326-2016
vs.

State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Respondent

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Lewis
I,

Alesia Winner,

Second Judicial District,
County of Lewis,

Clerk of the District Court of the

of the State of Idaho,

in and for the

do hereby certify that the above and foregoing

Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules.
I,

do further certify,

that all exhibits,

offered or

admitted in the above entitled cause, will be duly lodged with the
Clerk

of

the

Supreme Court

along with the
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clerk's

record,

as

required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I

have hereunto set my hand and

affixed the seal of said Court at Nezperce, Idaho, this
A

day of

,

f\. ~t1'£2r

{"_..,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
Perry Krinitt,
Plaintiff/ Appellant
CASE NO. CV-2012-146
Supreme Court No. 44326-2016
vs.

Certificate of Mailing
State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho,
Defendants/Respondents.

I, the undersigned, a Deputy Clerk of the above entitled
Court,

¥f:

do hereby certify that a copy of the Clerk's Record and

Reporter's Transcript was mailed on

1--

·''
/ ~·tr--day of

to the following persons:
Charles Carpenter
210 N Higgins Ave
Missoula MT 59802

Peter J Johnson
103 E Indiana Suite A
Spokane WA 99207-2317
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